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THE UNEXCEPTIONALISM OF "EVOLVING STANDARDS" 
* Corinna Barrett Lain 
Conventional wisdom is that outside the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme 
Court does not engage in the sort of explicitly majoritarian state nose-counting for 
which the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine is famous. Yet this impression 
is simply inaccurate. Across a stunning variety of civil liberties contexts, the Court 
routinely--and explicitly~termines constitutional protection based on whether a 
majority of states agree with it. This Article examines the Supreme Court's reliance 
on the majority position of the states w identify and apply constitutional norms, and 
then turns w the qualifications, explanations, and implications of state polling as a 
larger doctrinal phenomenon. While the past few years have seen an explosion of 
constitutional law scholarship demonstrating the Supreme Court's majoritarian ten-
dencies, the most powerful evidence of the Court's inherently majoritarian nature has 
been right under our noses aU along: its widespread use of explicitly majoritarian 
doctrine. 
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lNTRODUCfiON 
The Supreme Court's landmark death penalty rulings over the past several 
years have renewed scholarly criticism of the Eighth Amendment's "evolving 
standards of decency" doctrine. 1 Under the doctrine, a punishment violates 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause2 when a "national consensus" has 
formed against it, prohibiting a punishment only after a majority of states 
have already done so on their own.3 Critics claim that it makes no sense for 
1. Compare, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State 
Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1113 (2006) 
("[D]eclaring an action unconstitutional because a significant number of states prohibit the practice 
leaves the Supreme Court enforcing constitutional protections only in cases where they are least 
needed."), and MichaelS. Moore, Morality in Eighth Amendment]urisprndence, 31 HARV. J.L. & PuB. 
POL'Y 47, 63 (2008) ("What is the worth of a right good against the majority when that same majority 
interprets that right?"), and Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. &MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 475, 520 (2005) (lamenting need for constitutional protection "that is countermajoritarian 
in character and that does not blithely accept the prevailing outcome of political processes as fixing the 
constitutional baseline"), with, e.g., jOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 69 (1980) ("[l)t 
makes no sense to employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehicle for protecting minorities 
from the value judgments of the majority."), and William]. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and 
the Death Penalty: A View From the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 328--29 (1986) ("At the outset, it 
seems to me beyond dispute that we should not permit the legislature to define for us the scope of 
permissible punishment .... It would effectively write the clause out of the Bill of Rights were we to permit 
legislatures to police themselves by having the last word on the scope of the protection that the clause is 
intended to secure against their own overreaching."), and Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing 
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 88 n.200 (1989) ("The preferences of the majority should not 
determine the nature of the eighth amendment or of any other constitutional right."). For two of these 
rulings, see infra note 4. 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"). 
3. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 562-64 (2005) (discussing the importance of 
a "national consensus" in prior Eighth Amendment "evolving standards" cases, and noting that "[t)he 
beginning point [of analysis under the "evolving standards" doctrine) is a review of objective indicia 
of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the 
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constitutional protection to tum on whether a majority of states agree with it-
particularly in the capital context, where death penalty politics make tyranny 
of the majority more than a theoretical concem.4 T extualists counter that the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" 
invites, if not requires, protection that tracks majority preferences.5 
Implicit (and sometimes explicit) in the debate over "evolving standards" 
is the assumption that majoritarian doctrine-at least in the form of state legis-
lative consensus as a basis for constitutional protection6-is a distinctly Eighth 
Amendment phenomenon. Whether defending the doctrine or denouncing 
it, death penalty scholars routinely assume that the sort of state nose-counting 
that the Supreme Court does under the "evolving standards" doctrine does 
not occur elsewhere.7 In the larger academy, too, the reigning assumption is that 
question"); accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-16, 321-23 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361, 370-73 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 331, 334-35 (1989); McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987). 
4. For an excellent discussion of death penalry politics, see Stephen B. Bright, The Politics of 
Capital Punishment: The Sacrifice of Fairness for Executions, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH 
CAPITAL PuNISHMENT 127 (James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. Lanier eds., 2d ed. 
2003); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the Death Penalty in 
American PoUtics, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 711 (1990). For criticism of the "evolving 
standards" doctrine, see supra text accompanying note 1. 
5. See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If [a punishment] is not unusual, 
that is, if an objective examination of laws and jury determinations fails to demonstrate society's 
disapproval of it, the punishment is not unconstitutional even if out of accord with the theories of 
penology favored by the Justices of this Court."); Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Structure, Judicial 
Discretion, and the Eighth Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1149, 1200 (2006) ("Of course, even 
if a punishment is 'cruel,' it must also be 'unusual' to trigger scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment."); 
William C. Heffernan, Constitutional Historicism: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment Evolving 
Standards of Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1355, 1414 (2005) (acknowledging the textualist claim 
that "the term 'unusual' provides a unique license for judicial appeals to changing convictions and 
practices"); Akhil Reed A mar & Vikram David A mar, Eighth Amendment Mathematics (Part One): 
How the Atkins Justices Divided When Summing, FINDLA W, June 28, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
amar/20020628.html ("[T]he word 'unusual' in this clause invites attention to the way standards of 
decency evolve over time."); see also Jacobi, supra note 1, at 1098 ("A response to this criticism [of 
majoritarian protection] is that, while this may be ttue of constitutional interpretation generally, the phrase 
'cruel and unusual' necessitates an inquiry into social mores and practices to determine what is unusual."). 
6. Doctrine can be majoritarian in a number of different ways. My focus here is on doctrine 
that is majoritarian in the same sense that the "evolving standards" doctrine is majoritarian-it uses the 
majoriry position of the states to determine constitutional protection. 
7. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau, Interpreting the Eighth Amendment: Principled vs. PopuUst 
Strategies, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 789,810 (1996) ("We do not attempt to define or explain 'due 
process of law,' 'equal protection of the law,' 'an impartial jury,' or any other of the fundamental, 
normative constitutional concepts by making an appeal to what the majoriry believes or accepts .... Out 
of considerations of consistency alone, therefore, we should hesitate to incorporate majoritarian 
considerations into our interpretation of the Eighth Amendment."); James W. Ellis, Disability Advocacy 
and the Death Penalty: The Road From Penry w Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 173, 178 (2003) ("But while 
the Court, in interpreting other parts of the Constitution, occasionally observes that a particular state's 
statute is unique or unusual, it is only in the context of the Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment 
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explicitly majoritarian doctrine is an exclusively Eighth Amendment affair-
an approach limited to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the 
death penalty cases that dominate this comer of constitutionallaw.8 
But what if that assumption is wrong? 
As it turns out, the Supreme Court's explicitly majoritarian approach to 
Eighth Amendment protection is not all that different from what the Court 
does in other constitutional contexts. From due process to equal protection, from 
the First Amendment to the Fourth and Sixth, the Supreme Court routinely-
that such comparisons are given doctrinal significance. This unique feature of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence derives, of course, from the text's prohibition on the infliction of 'cruel and unusual 
punishments."'); Heffernan, supra note 5, at 1362-63 (describing "evolving standards" doctrine as a 
"conspicuous exception" to the Supreme Court's approach in other doctrinal areas and advocating 
that it be used elsewhere); Stacy, supra note 1, at 478,494-96,524-27 ("This deference to majoritarian 
judgments, which gives rise to the Justices' publicized jurisdiction-counting debates, conflicts with 
the independent role the Court has assumed in interpreting other countermajoritarian constitutional 
rights," contrasting the Supreme Court's approach under the Eighth Amendment and other 
constitutional provisions.); see also Joseph L. Hoffmann, The "Cruel and Unusual Punishment" 
Clause: A Umit on the Power w Punish or Constitutional Rhetoric?, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN 
AMERICA 140-41 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely eds., 1993) (contrasting the majoritarian 
nature of constitutional inquiry under the Eighth Amendment with that undertaken in the First and 
Fourth Amendment contexts). 
8. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 246, 266 & n.125 (2008) ("[l]t is unusual for the Court to acknowledge the relevance 
of the national consensus," noting in accompanying footnote that "[t]he Court occasionally does refer 
to such a consensus in the Eighth Amendment context, but the word 'unusual' in the amendment 
provides a textual hook for that approach in these cases." (citations omitted)); Kermit Roosevelt III, 
Polyphonic Stare Decisis: Ustening w Non-Article III Actors, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1303, 1331 
(2008) (arguing that constitutional norms are influenced by the prevailing social climate and that in 
some cases, "perhaps limited to the Eighth Amendment," the unusualness of a practice should itself be 
reason to reconsider precedents in light of a new state of affairs); see also John Ferejohn & Larry D. 
Kramer, Judicial Independence in a Democracy: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, in NORMS AND THE LAW 
161-207 (John N. Droback ed., 2006) (discussing "doctrinal limitations" on the Supreme Court's 
countermajoritarian capacity, such as principles of justiciability, federalism, and legislative deference 
in standards of review, but not mentioning state consensus-based doctrine); jEFFREY ROSEN, THE 
MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH 12 (2006) (discussing the possibility of the Supreme Court consulting 
state legislation for constitutional views of national majorities, citing only the "evolving standards" 
doctrine as an example); William N. Eskridge, Jr., America's Statutory "Constitution," 41 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1 (2007) (arguing that legislation has become the primary source of constitutional values in 
our society, but not mentioning state legislation as a doctrinal phenomenon outside the Eighth 
Amendment and select due process cases); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 
117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007) (discussing state legislation as a way of protecting constitutional values 
outside the Constitution, but not mentioning state legislation as an actual source of constitutional 
norms); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 
80 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2002) (discussing various ways that nonjudical actors interpret the constitution, 
including the President, Congress, and others, but not mentioning state legislatures as a source of 
constitutional interpretation). 
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and explicitly--determines constitutional protection based on whether a major-
ity of states agrees with it. By and large, we simply haven't noticed.9 
The implications are striking. For death penalty scholars, the phenomenon 
of explicitly majoritarian decisionmaking outside the Eighth Amendment calls 
into question the leading defense of the "evolving standards" doctrine-majori-
tarian Eighth Amendment text.10 If the Court is polling states in and outside 
the Eighth Amendment, then majoritarian constitutional text cannot be all that 
is driving majoritarian constitutional doctrine. 
In the broader body of constitutional law scholarship, the implications are 
larger yet. Over the past few years, the country's top constitutional scholars 
have filled volumes of law reviews convincing us that the Supreme Court is an 
inherently majoritarian institution,11 and it is. But the most powerful evidence 
of the Court's majoritarian proclivities has gone virtually unnoticed, although 
right under our noses all along: its widespread use of explicitly majoritarian 
doctrine. Explicitly majoritarian doctrine shatters the conventional understand-
ing of the Court as a countermajoritarian institution, challenges the theoretical 
9. A few scholars recognize the Court's use of explicitly majoritarian doctrine in the substantive 
due process area. See infra text accompanying note 18. Otherwise, I have found just four discussions 
on point. Two are seminal pieces, excellent although limited in scope. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue 
and judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 592--607 (1993) (focusing discussion on Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury context while recognizing larger phenomenon); Steven L. Winter, 
Tennessee v. Gamer and the Democratic Practice of judicial Review, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 679, 683-91 (1986) (focusing discussion on Fourth Amendment context while recognizing 
larger phenomenon). The other two are recent works that incorporate these early insights into 
related discussions. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting Scates, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17 (2009) 
(arguing that to the extent that the Supreme Court counts states, it does so as a limit on, rather than 
source of, constitutional law and as such, is consistent with federalism principles); Note, Srate Law as 
"Other Law": Our Fifty Sovereigns in the Federal Constitutional Canon, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1670 (2007) 
(comparing Supreme Court's reliance on state counting and foreign law). 
10. See supra text accompanying note 5 (discussing textual defense of "evolving standards" 
doctrine based on words "cruel and unusual" in the Eighth Amendment (emphasis added)). 
11. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006) (discussing role that social movements play in constitutional understanding); 
Barry Friedman, The Politics of judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005) (arguing that normative 
constitutional theory about judicial review will remain impoverished until it incorporates the nonlegal 
influences that motivate judges to act as they do); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (aru:l 
Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431 (2005) (discussing influence of broader sociopolitical mores on 
Supreme Court's decisions in Brown v. Board of Education and Lawrence v. Texas); Larry Kramer, 
Generating Constitutional Meaning, 94 CA. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (2006) (stressing extralegal influences 
on the shape of constitutional law and lauding Reva Siegel's work on constitutional culture and social 
movements as "the new center of academic work in constitutional theory"); Robert C. Post, Fashioning 
the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003) (discussing dialectical 
relationship between culture and constitutional law); see also Sunstein, supra note 8 (discussing District 
of Columbia ~~. Heller as a decision that tracked majoriry preferences although it was formally decided on 
originalist grounds). 
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underpinnings of judicial review, and casts the story of "Our Federalism"12 in 
an entirely new light. It shakes the bedrock principles of constitutional law. 
This Article examines the Supreme Court's reliance on the majority 
position of the states to identify and apply constitutional norms outside the 
Eighth Amendment. Part I explores the phenomenon in the Due Process 
Clause, the constitutional catchall for a number of substantive and procedural 
protections. Part II explores the phenomenon in the Equal Protection Clause 
and First Amendment, provisions famous for providing countermajoritarian 
protection. Part Ill explores the phenomenon in the criminal context, turning 
to the Fourth and Sixth Amendments. Part IV discusses the qualifications, 
explanations, and implications of state polling as a larger doctrinal phenomenon. 
The Article concludes that we should talk about, and teach, the unexception-
alism of "evolving standards." Constitutional theory should reflect the reality 
of constitutional law. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CATCHALL: DUE PROCESS 
Since colonial times, the Due Process Clause has served as a constitutional 
catchall for a variety of substantive and procedural protections. 13 In large 
part, this variety is what makes the Due Process Clause one of the strongest 
examples of explicitly majoritarian decisionmaking outside the Eighth Amend-
ment. Nothing about the phrase "due process" requires or even necessarily 
invites protection based on state legislative consensus, yet the Supreme Court's 
doctrine in this area is riddled with the same state nose-counting for which the 
"evolving standards" doctrine is famous. An examination of several substan-
tive and procedural due process protections illustrates the point. 
12. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,44-45 (1971) ("[A] proper respect for state functions, 
a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, 
and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their 
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for 
lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as 'Our Federalism' .... "). 
13. See RODNEYL MOTI, DUE PROCESS OF LAW§ 54, at 142 (1926) (noting that American 
colonists saw the Due Process Clause as "a catch-all phrase for human rights rather than a phrase 
with a well defined content"); see also Shawn P. Davisson, Balancing the Scales of "Confidentkd" Justice, 
38 McGEORGE L. REV. 679, 688 (2007) ("The guarantee of due process is often portrayed as a catch-
all provision .... "). 
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A. Substantive Due Process 
The notion of substantive due process is, as others have noted,' 4 an oxy-
moron. That the Due Process Clause would protect something other than 
process is itself "a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness,"' 
to borrow from John Hart Ely's famous line.15 To fill the void in constitutional 
meaning, the Supreme Court in the post-Lochner16 era has frequently turned 
to the states to define substantive due process protection.17 Today, one can see 
the approach at work in at least three doctrinal areas: fundamental rights, 
punitive damages, and selective incorporation. 
1. Fundamental Rights 
To the limited extent that scholars have recognized the phenomenon of 
explicitly majoritarian doctrine outside the Eighth Amendment, they have 
generally done so in the substantive due process context of fundamental 
rights. 18 Given the Supreme Court's fundamental rights doctrine, this comes 
as no surprise. As (most) every law student knows, legislation that burdens 
a fundamental right must be narrowly tailored to a compelling government 
14. For a discussion of the literature, see James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth 
and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 319 (1999). 
15. ELY, supra note 1, at 18. 
16. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
17. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 200 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (upholding minimum 
wage legislation against substantive due process challenge, reasoning, "The legislature had the right 
to consider that its minimum wage requirements would be an important aid in carrying out its policy 
of protection. The adoption of similar requirements by many States evidences a deep-seated conviction 
both as to the presence of the evil and as to the means adapted to check it."). 
18. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REv. 63, 124-
33 (2006) (recognizing implicit doctrine of "evolving national values" in Supreme Court's most 
recent substantive due process cases, and pointing to Eighth Amendment "evolving standards" 
doctrine as precedent and guidance for developing the doctrine); Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-judicial 
Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 714, 741-42 (2008) (recognizing state practice as a constitutional 
benchmark in both the Eighth Amendment and substantive due process contexts); Michael W. 
McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL L. REV. 173, 174 
(noting that while constitutional theory has been dominated by originalist and moral reasoning 
approaches, in practice a third approach has appeared--one grounded on "the gradually evolving 
moral principles of the nation" and exemplified by the Court's most recent substantive due process 
decisions); Robert F. Nagel, Disagreement and Interpretation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Autumn 
1993, at 11, 19 (recognizing the role of state legislation in the use of"tradition" to define due process 
rights); Benjamin). Roesch, Crowd Control: The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion 
in Doctrine, 39 SUFK>LK U. L. REV. 379,382 (2006) (noting "striking similarities" between substantive 
due process analysis in recent cases and Eighth Amendment "evolving standards" analysis, and absence 
of similar doctrinal developments elsewhere); Stacy, supra note 1, at 496 (noting that at times, 
"the Court has appealed to majoritarian judgments as defining the scope of fundamental substantive 
due process rights"). 
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interest.19 Legislation that does not burden a fundamental right, by contrast, 
need only be rationally related to a legitimate government objective.20 In this 
area, then, the appropriate analysis turns on a single threshold issue: whether 
the legislation burdens a fundamental right. 
Although in decades past, the Supreme Court identified fundamental 
rights based on its independent judgment of the right's importance,21 today the 
Court's approach is firmly majoritarian. According to the Supreme Court, only 
those liberties "deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition" qualify as 
fundamental, an objective inquiry in which "[o]ur Nation's history, legal 
traditions, and practices" stand as "crucial guideposts for responsible decisionmak-
ing."22 Central to this analysis is the position taken by state legislatures, which 
the Court has described as "'the primary and most reliable indication of consen-
sus."'23 For death penalty scholars, the latter quote should sound familiar-it 
was imported straight from an "evolving standards" case.24 Indeed, the entire 
fundamental rights analysis is almost exactly the same as the analysis the Court 
uses under the "evolving standards" doctrine. 
A comparison of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Lawrence v. 
Texas25 and Roper v. Simmons26 illustrates the point. Lawence is the Court's 2003 
substantive due process case invalidating state statutes that criminalized same-
sex sodomy.27 Roper is the Court's 2005 "evolving standards" case invalidating 
the juvenile death penalty.28 Despite these decisions' different nomenclatures, the 
Court's analysis in each proceeded in the same lockstep fashion. In both 
19. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (noting that fundamental 
rights may not be infringed "'no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest"' (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993))); 
see also jOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 471-72 (7th ed. 2004) 
(discussing the six categories of rights thus far deemed fundamental). 
20. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 (noting that only fundamental rights require "more 
than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to justify the action"); see also NOWAK & 
ROTUNDA, supra note 19, at 471-72 (discussing substantive due process standards of review). 
21. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing the right to privacy as 
fundamental in context of abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 4 79 ( 1965) (recognizing the 
right to privacy as fundamental in context of access to contraceptives); see also Post, supra note 11, at 
88--91 (discussing the trend prior to 1980s, particularly in the area of sexuality, of identifying liberty 
interests "by directly evaluating the intrinsic value of liberty itself'). 
22. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 
(1992)). 
23. I d. at 711 ('"[T]he primary and most reliable indication of [a national] consensus is ... the 
pattern of enacted laws."' (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,373 (1989)). 
24. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373 ("[T]he primary and most reliable indication of consensus 
is ... the pattern of enacted laws."). 
25. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
26. 543 u.s. 551 (2005). 
27. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
28. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570-74. 
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decisions, the Court focused its discussion on the state legislative landscape, 
first examining current statutes,29 then turning to state legislative trends,30 
and then finally noting underenforcement of those statutes that allowed the 
challenged practice to remain.31 Even the standard the Court used to articulate 
its decisions-relying on an "emerging awareness" of the liberty interest at 
issue in Lawrence and on "evolving standards of decency" in Roper-was 
strikingly similar.32 
In the academy, Lawrence garnered substantial attention among scholars 
who view the Supreme Court as an essentially majoritarian institution-but 
for reasons that had nothing to do with majoritarian doctrine. For these 
scholars, Lawrence was a reminder of how the Justices are influenced by the 
sociopolitical mores of the larger society in which they live.33 It was a lesson 
about the dialectical relationship between culture and constitutionallaw.34 It 
was an example of the political nature of judicial review.35 And it was an 
illustration of how social movements can create constitutional change.36 Yet for 
all the discourse on Lawrence as a majoritarian decision, there was virtually 
29. Compare Lal.lffence, 539 U.S. at 572, with Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-65. 
30. Compare Lal.lffence, 539 U.S. at 571-73, with Roper, 543 U.S. at 565-67. 
31. Compare Lal.lffence, 539 U.S. at 573, with Roper, 543 U.S. at 565-66. 
32. Compare Lal.lffence, 539 U.S. at 571-72 (recognizing an "emerging awareness that liberty 
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex"), with Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-61 (referring to "the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society" to determine whether a punishment violates the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause). 
33. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 11 (discussing Lal.lffence as a product of broader sociopolitical 
mores); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Auwnomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 
2003 SUP. Cr. REV. 2 7, 2 7 (discussing Lal.lffence as a reminder that "members of the Supreme Court 
live in society, and they are inevitably influenced by what society appears to think"). 
34. See, e.g., Post, supra note 11 (discussing Lal.lffence as a cultural product and opening bid in 
a conversation with the American public about homosexual rights). 
35. See NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE 0EMOCRA TIC CONSTITUTION 3, 143-44 (2004) 
(discussing Lal.lffence as an example of how "nearly all landmark Supreme Court decisions cannot be 
understood without first paying attention to the politics surrounding them"); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, 
JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 222-25 (2004) 
(discussing Lal.lffence as an example of the democratic nature of judicial review); Richard A. Posner, 
Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 ( 2005) (discussing Lal.lffence as a reflection of the 
Justices' political preferences); Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and 
Function of judicial Review, 72 U. ON. L. REv. 1257, 1300-03 (2004) (discussing Lal.lffence as a reflection 
of mainstream public opinion from a political science perspective). 
36. See, e.g., Balkin & Siegel, supra note 11, at 948-49 (discussing Lal.lffence v. Texas as an 
example of how social movements "can change the meaning of constitutional norms"); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 
88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (2004) (discussing Lal.lffence as evidence that the Court "is responsive 
to the constitutional politics of social movements"); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping 
Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 CoLUM. L. REv. 1955, 1961 (2006) 
(discussing Lal.lffence as an example of how "courts are inescapably involved in absorbing, evaluating, 
and influencing changes to popular judgments regarding social groups"). 
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no discussion of the Court's explicitly majoritarian legal analysis in the case.17 
Pages upon pages of commentary about how Lawrence constitutionalized na-
tional norms somehow missed the significance of the fact that the Supreme 
Court actually told us that this is what it was trying to do. 
What explains the dearth of discussion on state counting in Lawrence? 
My best guess is that scholars simply have not seen it as part of a larger doctrinal 
phenomenon. Indeed, it is tempting to dismiss even the similarities between 
Lawrence and Roper as products of the same author, for Justice Kennedy wrote 
both38-but other fundamental rights cases have used the same analytic 
approach. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 39 the 1986 decision that 
Lawrence overruled, the Court relied heavily on the fact that "until1961, all 
50 states outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 states and the District of Columbia 
continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and 
between consenting adults."40 And in other fundamental rights cases since 
then, the Court has also relied on state legislative consensus to decide substan-
tive due process claims. For example, the Court polled the states in deciding the 
right to physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill competent adults,41 the right 
to refuse unwanted medical treatment,42 the right to parental recognition of a 
3 7. This is not to say that majoritarian doctrine was never mentioned. Occasionally it was, 
but more often it wasn't, or was mentioned but discounted as a reason for the Court's decision. See, 
e.g., DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 35, at 139--44 (discussing state positions on same-sex sodomy 
prohibitions, but not mentioning the Court's reliance on those positions in its opinion); SAGER, 
supra note 35, at 223-24 ("Nor did the Court in Lawrence bend to the chore of aligning its judgment 
with the process of democratic choice .... When the claims of John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron 
Garner were presented to the Court, what mattered was not the number of electoral votes that 
sponsored them .... "); Sunstein, supra note 33, at 49-50 (discussing various readings of Lawrence, 
including one reviving common law doctrine of desuetude, but viewing that doctrine as a procedural 
protection against arbitrary enforcement within a jurisdiction rather than as a substantive constraint 
on national outliers, and in any event doubting its current vitality, noting that "[m]ost American courts 
do not accept that idea in express terms"); see also Posner, supra note 35, at 85 (dismissing the Supreme 
Court's consensus-based decisionmaking in Lawrence as "an effort to ground controversial Supreme Court 
judgments in something more objective than the Justices' political preferences and thus to make the 
Court's political decisions seem less political"). 
38. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 561 
(2003). 
39. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
40. Id. at 193-94. The Court continued, "Against this background, to claim that a right to 
engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious." Id. at 194. 
41. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) ("In almost every State-indeed, 
in almost every western democracy-it is a crime to assist a suicide."). 
42. See Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990) (relying on procedure "[a]t 
common law and by statute in most states" to validate state regulation of third-party decisions to 
terminate medical treatment). 
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child born into another couple's marriage,43 and the right of custodial parents to 
make visitation decisions regarding their children and natural grandparents.44 
In these and other substantive due process cases, what made a "fundamental 
right" fundamental was whether the states had deemed it worthy of protec-
tion on their own.45 
2. Punitive Damages Caps 
The fundamental rights doctrine is a strong example of explicitly ma-
joritarian substantive due process protection, but it is by no means the only 
one. Consider briefly the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence.46 
According to the Court, the Due Process Clause also imposes substantive limits 
on the size of punitive damages awards, prohibiting awards deemed "grossly 
excessive."47 So how does one tell when an award is grossly excessive? 
In this narrow but increasingly important area of law, the Supreme Court's 
answer is again explicitly majoritarian. Under the three-part test enunciated 
in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,48 the Court assesses the constitutionality 
of punitive damages awards by considering first, the seriousness of the miscon-
duct at issue; second, the punitive damages-to-actual-harm ratio; and third, 
the statutory penalties authorized for comparable conduct.49 
Gore's doctrinal framework is majoritarian in two ways. The third "Gore 
guidepost"50 is explicit in this regard. It calls for courts to consider punitive 
43. See Michael H. v Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125-27 (1989) (examining state statutes to 
support the conclusion that "the ability of a person in Michael's position to claim paternity has not 
been generally acknowledged"). 
44. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 71 (2000) ("Significantly, many other States expressly 
provide by statute that courts may not award visitation unless a parent has denied (or unreasonably 
denied) [it] to the concerned third party."). 
45. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (rejecting substantive due process 
challenge to detention of juvenile aliens stating, "[t]he mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough 
to doubt that 'substantive due process' sustains it; the alleged right certainly cannot be considered 'so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"'); see also 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-05 (1977) (invalidating a statute limiting 
housing to nuclear families in light of "this Nation's history and tradition" of supporting extended 
family households). 
46. I credit Pam Karlan, with thanks, for bringing this area to my attention. 
47. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) ("Only when an award can 
fairly be categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to these interests does it enter the zone of 
arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); TXO Prod. 
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1993) ("[T]he Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment imposes substantive limits 'beyond which penalties may not go."' (quoting 
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907))). 
48. 517 u.s. 559. 
49. See id. at 574-75 (discussing three guideposts). 
50. See supra note 49. 
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damages awards against the statutory fines available for comparable conduct 
in the same and other jurisdictions, 51 and to give '"substantial deference' to legis-
lative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue."52 
The second "Gore guidepost," which considers the ratio of punitive dam-
ages to actual harm, is not explicitly majoritarian, but results in the same 
consensus-driven analysis. Under this guidepost, which the Supreme Court 
has recognized as both "significant" and the "most commonly cited indicum 
of an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award,"53 the Court again 
relies on the predominant position of the states to define the limits of due 
process protection. For example, in Gore itself, the Court relied on over sixty-
five state statutes "dating back over 700 years and going forward to today"54 in 
recognizing double, treble, and quadruple damages as a benchmark of reasonable-
ness against which punitive damages awards were to be judged.55 In subsequent 
cases, too, the Court has relied on these benchmarks, invalidating punitive 
damages awards that depart significantly from state practice and validating 
those that do not.56 
In the punitive damages context, then, the doctrine is part formally majori-
tarian and part majoritarian as applied. Either way, the result is the same: 
substantive due process protection aimed at what the Supreme Court itself has 
characterized as "outlier punitive damages awards."57 Upon reflection, this 
should come as little surprise. Defining excessiveness is difficult, if not impos-
sible, without reference to some normative baseline; to know what is excessive, 
one must first know what is not. Indeed, to the extent that the "evolving stan-
dards" doctrine is just an objective way of measuring grossly disproportionate 
51. See, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. at 584 (comparing sanction imposed on BMW against statutory 
fines available under Alabama and New York law). 
52. I d. at 583. 
53. Id. at 580--81. 
54. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (explaining 
that the Supreme Court in Gore "further referenced a long legislative history, dating back over 700 
years and going forward to today, providing for sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages to 
deter and punish"). 
55. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 581 ("Some 65 different enactments during the period between 
1275 and 1753 provided for double, treble, or quadruple damages."); supra note 54. 
56. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. 0:>. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991) (upholding punitive 
damages award more than four times the amount of compensatory damages but calling it "close to the 
line" of constitutional violation); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008) 
(polling states to support imposition of a maximum punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio as a matter 
of maritime common law and noting that under facts of that case, the maritime limit may be "the 
outermost limit of the due process guarantee" as well (quoting CampbeU, 538 U.S. at 425)). 
57. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2626-27. 
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punishments, 58 what the Court does in the punitive damages area and what it 
does under the Eighth Amendment is (again) essentially the same. 
3. Selective Incorporation 
The Supreme Court's selective incorporation doctrine straddles the 
substantive and procedural sides of the Due Process Clause. It is substantive 
in the sense that it recognizes particular provisions of the Bill of Rights as a 
substantive component of due process protection.59 It is procedural in the sense 
that many, if not most, of those guarantees are themselves procedural in nature. 60 
Although in years past, several of the Court's members-Justice Black, most 
famously-maintained that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause 
incorporated all of the Bill of Rights guarantees,61 the Supreme Court has never 
taken that approach. Instead, it has incorporated only those provisions deemed 
"fundamental"-the same standard the Court uses to identify unenumerated 
substantive due process rights.62 Because the Court's selective incorporation 
doctrine is just its fundamental rights doctrine applied in the Bill of Rights 
context, the analysis is predictably the same.63 To determine which rights are 
58. The Supreme Court has couched the doctrine this way. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 561 (2005) ("[W]e have established the propriety and affirmed the necessity of referring to 
'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society' to determine which 
punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual."); accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304,311-12 (2002). 
59. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 19, at 464-67 (discussing the Court's incorporated 
provisions of the Bill of Rights in substantive due process chapter). 
60. See infra text accompanying notes 72-77. 
61. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 19, at 464 ("A few Justices, most notably Justice 
Black, argued that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment indicated that all of the Bill of Rights 
were to be made directly applicable to the states."). In fairness, Justice Black's preferred position was 
to rely on the Privileges and Immunities Clause for total incorporation, but the Slaughrer-House Cases 
rendered that an impossibility, leaving him with only the Due Process Clause to support his position. 
See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74-75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing for total 
incorporation under Due Process Clause while noting that the Fourteenth Amendment was "sufficiently 
explicit to guarantee that thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections 
of the Bill of Rights"); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (limiting Privileges and Immunities 
Clause to privileges of national citizenship). 
62. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) ("Because we believe that trial 
by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be 
tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee."). See generally 
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 19, at 465 (describing selective incorporation as the concept 
"whereby a provision of the Bill of Rights is made applicable to the states if the Justices are of the 
opinion that it was meant to protect a 'fundamental' aspect of liberty"); supra Part l.A.1 (discussing 
substantive due process fundamental rights doctrine). 
63. Indeed, the Court has articulated the same standards in both areas and even treated precedent 
interchangeably. Compare Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (describing 
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sufficiently fundamental to incorporate into the Due Process Clause, here again 
the Court relies on state legislative consensus. 
The Supreme Court's 1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio64 provides a fitting 
example. In Mapp, the Court incorporated the Fourth Amendment's exclu-
sionary rule to the states, launching the 1960s criminal procedure revolution65 
and the modem, "selective" approach to incorporation.66 Although prior cases 
had recognized the importance of "a strong consensus of views in the states" 
in the incorporation analysis,67 Mapp showed just how pivotal state legislative 
consensus could be. Defending its decision to abandon Wolf v. Colorado's68 
1949 holding to the contrary,69 the Court in Mapp explained: 
While in 1949, prior to the Wolf case, almost two-thirds of the States 
were opposed to the use of the exclusionary rule, now, despite the Wolf 
case, more than half of those since passing on it, by their own legisla-
tive or judicial opinion, have wholly or partly adopted or adhered to it. 70 
fundamental right in substantive due process context as that which is "deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition"), with Palko v. O:mnecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (describing fundamental 
right in incorporation context as that which is "so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people 
as to be ranked as fundamental"). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (quoting 
Palko in the substantive due process context). 
64. 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
65. See id. at 655 ("We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of 
the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state coun."); Corinna Barrett Lain, 
Countermajaritarian Hero ar Zero! Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 
152 U. PENN. L REv.l361, 1372-73 (2004) (discussing Mapp's role in the criminal procedure revolution). 
66. Prior to selective incorporation, the Court used a "fundamental fairness" approach to 
incorporation. Under the fundamental fairness approach, the Court incorporated only those applications 
of a right that were deemed fundamental, rather than the right itself. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra 
note 19, at 462-67 (comparing selective incorporation and fundamental fairness doctrines). 
6 7. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 11 7, 130 n.ll ( 1961) (considering a due process claim in the 
context of attorney disbarment proceedings, defining reasonableness "in much the same way that a 
strong consensus of views in the States is relevant to a finding of fundamental unfairness"); see also 
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (193 7) (noting in the context of incorporation of 
the right to a jury that "[d]oubts must be resolved, not subjectively by recourse of the judge to his own 
sympathy and emotions, but by objective standards such as may be observed in the laws and practices of 
the community taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 
73 (1932) (noting in the context of incorporation of the right to counsel that "[a] rule adopted with 
such unanimous accord reflects, if it does not establish, the inherent right to have counsel appointed, at 
least in cases like the present, and lends convincing support to the conclusion we have reached as to the 
fundamental narure of that right"). 
68. 338 u.s. 25 (1949). 
69. See id. at 29-30 (rejecting the claim that the exclusionary rule was fundamental and thus 
applied to states). The Court in Wolf also counted states to suppon its ruling. See id. at 33-39 (surveying 
state positions on the exclusionary rule in Tables A-J). 
70. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651. 
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By the Court's own account, it was the "seemingly inexorable" movement of 
the states that finally moved constitutionallaw.71 
The Supreme Court's majoritarian approach to incorporation in Mapp 
was no anomaly. After Mapp, the Court selectively incorporated almost all of 
the remaining Bill of Rights guarantees,72 similarly relying on the fact that 
most states had already recognized the protection on their own. For example, 
the Coun counted states in incorporating the right to counsel,73 the right to jury 
trial/4 the right to confrontation,75 and the right to a speedy trial.76 It likewise 
counted states when incorporating the protections against double jeopardy 
and prosecutorial comments on a defendant's failure to testify.77 On each of 
these occasions, the Court was ostensibly asking whether "a civilized system 
could be imagined that would not accord the particular protection."78 But in 
71. Id. at 660 ("'Moreover, the experience of the states is impressive .... The movement 
towards the rule of exclusion has been halting but seemingly inexorable."' {quoting Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1960))). 
72. Most of these were criminal procedure protections. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 
19, at 397 ("Of the first eight Amendments the Supreme Court has held explicitly that only three of 
the individual guarantees are inapplicable to the states."); id. at 465--67 (discussing in detail individual 
provisions incorporated); infra text accompanying notes 73-77. 
73. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, stating that "Florida, supported by two other States, has asked that 
Betts v. Brady be left intact. Twenty-two States, as friends of the Court, argued that Betts was 'an 
anachronism when handed down' and that it should now be overruled. We agree."). 
74. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury, noting that "(t]he laws of every State guarantee a right to jury trial in serious criminal 
cases; no State has dispensed with it; nor are there significant movements underway to do so"). 
75. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 402 (1965) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment 
confrontation clause, reasoning that "the right of confrontation [i)s 'one of the fundamental guaranties 
of life and liberty,' and ... 'guarded against legislative and judicial action by provisions in the consti-
tution of the United States and in the constitutions of most, if not of all, the states composing the 
Union"' (quoting Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55,56 (1899))). 
76. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 225-26 (1967) ("That this right was considered 
fundamental at this early period in our history is evidenced by its guarantee in the constitutions of 
several of the states of the new nation, as well as by its prominent position in the Sixth Amendment. 
Today, each of the 50 States guarantees the right to a speedy trial to its citizens." (internal citation 
omitted)). 
77. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment 
double jeopardy clause and explaining, "Today, every state incorporates some form of the prohibition in 
its constitution or common law"); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611 n.3 (1965) (incorporating the 
Fifth Amendment protection against comments on the defendant's failure to testify and explaining that 
"[t)he overwhelming consensus of the States ... is opposed to allowing comment on the defendant's failure 
to testify. The legislatures or courts of 44 states have recognized that such comment is, in light of the 
privilege against self-incrimination, 'an unwarrantable line of argument."' {quoting State v. Howard, 14 
S.E. 481,483 (S.C. 1892))). 
78. Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 ( 1968); accord Palko v. Connecticut, 302 
U.S. 319,325 (1937) (asking whether "a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible" 
without the protection at issue). 
380 57 UCLA LAW REVIEW 365 (2009) 
asking that question, the Justices used little imagination. As elsewhere, they 
surveyed the states instead. 
B. Procedural Due Process 
Lest one think that only the Supreme Court's substantive due process cases 
are explicitly majoritarian, I now tum to the process side of due process. Here 
the Court is free of the paradox that in the substantive due process context led it 
to create doctrine whole cloth, yet its use of state legislative consensus to decide 
due process protection remains. To see the phenomenon at work, consider the 
Court's decisionmaking in three procedural due process contexts: fundamental 
procedures, notice and opportunity to be heard, and burdens of proof. 
1. Fundamental Procedures 
Just as the Due Process Clause protects certain substantive rights because 
they are considered fundamental, it also protects certain procedural rights be-
cause they are considered fundamental. Indeed, the standard that the Court 
uses to identify fundamental rights in the procedural due process context is 
almost identical to the standard it uses to identify fundamental rights in the 
substantive due process context: the right must be "so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."79 Here again, 
the result is a decisionmaking framework that looks to the states to delineate the 
contours of constitutional protection. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Schad v. Arizona80 provides a revealing 
discussion of the importance of state legislative consensus in the Court's analysis. 
In Schad, the defendant argued that due process required the jury to agree on 
a single theory of mens rea to support his conviction for first-degree murder.81 
The Court rejected that contention, emphasizing "the importance of history 
79. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); accord Oist. Att'y's Office for Third 
Judicial Oist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2332 (2009); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 
(1992); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958). Indeed, some of the Court's substantive due 
process decisions use this articulation of the standard. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
593 (2003); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 22 and 63 (discussing standards for identifying fundamental rights in substantive due process 
and selective incorporation contexts). 
80. 501 u.s. 624 (1991). 
81. In accordance with Arizona law, the prosecutor in Schad's case had advanced both premedi-
tated and felony-murder theories to support the first-degree murder conviction, and the trial court 
had not required the jury to agree on one of the two theories, as both satisfied the mens rea requirement 
for first-degree murder. See id. at 624, 629. 
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and widely shared practice as concrete indicators of what fundamental fairness 
and rationality require."8z According to the Court, 
Where a State's particular way of defining a crime has a long history, or 
is in widespread use, it is unlikely that a defendant will be able to demon-
strate that a state has ... defined as a single crime multiple offenses that 
are inherently separate. Conversely, a freakish definition of the elements 
of a crime that finds no analogue in history or in the criminal law of 
other jurisdictions will lighten the defendant's burden.83 
After placing Arizona's approach to first-degree murder within "the norm" of 
a majority of states,84 the Court went on to explain: 
Such historical and contemporary acceptance of Arizona's definition of 
the offense and verdict practice is a strong indication that they do not 
'offend some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience 
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,' for we recognize the 
high probability that legal definitions, and the practices comporting with 
them, are unlikely to endure for long, or to retain wide acceptance, if 
they are at odds with notions of fairness and rationality sufficiently 
fundamental to be comprehended in due process.85 
In short, if a procedure was truly inconsistent with due process, most states 
would not be using it. 
Other decisions similarly showcase the Supreme Court polling the states 
to decide the limits of procedural due process protection. For example, the 
Court has counted states to decide a procedural due process challenge to a state's 
definition of insanity.86 It has counted states to decide a procedural due process 
challenge to a state's exclusion of evidence on the issue of a defendant's mental 
state.87 It has counted states to decide a procedural due process challenge to 
82. Id. at 640. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 642 ("[llhere is sufficiently widespread acceptance of the two mental states as alterna-
tive means of satisfying the mens rea element of the single crime of first-degree murder to persuade us 
that Arizona has not departed from the norm."). 
85. Id. (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)). 
86. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 748-52 (2006) (rejecting defendant's claim that due 
process entitled him to at least the M'Naghten test on issue of insanity, surveying states and concluding, 
"(w]ith this varied background, it is clear that no particular formulation has evolved into a baseline 
for due process, and that the insanity rule, like the conceptualization of criminal offenses, is substantially 
open to state choice"). 
87. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 46-49, 51 (1996) (rejecting defendant's claim that 
due process entitled him to submit evidence of intoxication on the issue of his mental state at the 
time of the offense, surveying states, and concluding: "Although the rule allowing a jury to consider 
evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication where relevant to mens rea has gained considerable 
acceptance, it is of too recent vintage, and has not received sufficiently uniform and permanent 
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pretrial detention of juveniles.88 And, most recently, it has counted states to 
decide a procedural due process challenge to a state's post-conviction procedures 
for DNA testing of evidence.89 In these and other cases,90 the Court used the 
majority position of the states to define the "traditions and conscience of our 
people" embodied in due process. 
Granted, the Court also has clarified on several occasions that the states' 
position on an issue is not conclusive in its due process analysis.91 Yet over the 
years, a consensus among the states (or lack thereof) has been described as 
u • h 'd ,92 " . . n9J " . 'f' ,94 d u . wetg ty evt ence, convmcmg support, stgm tcant, an a pnmary 
guide"95 in the Court's procedural due process analysis. Simply put, the consen-
sus view of the states does not decide the matter-as in the "evolving standards" 
context, the Justices can always go against the grain96-but it comes close. 
allegiance, to qualify as fundamental, especially since it displaces a lengthy common-law tradition 
which remains supported by valid justifications today."). 
88. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1984) (rejecting defendant's claim that due 
process prevented pretrial detention of juveniles, surveying states and concluding, "[i]n light of the 
uniform legislative judgment that pretrial detention of juveniles properly promotes the interests both 
of society and the juvenile, we conclude that the practice serves a legitimate regulatory purpose compatible 
with the 'fundamental fairness' demanded by the Due Process Clause in juvenile proceedings"). 
89. See Dist. Att'y's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316, 2320-
21 (2009) (rejecting a procedural due process challenge to Alaska's postconviction relief procedures 
for persons seeking access to evidence for DNA testing, noting that forty-six states have statutes 
governing access to DNA testing and that while Alaska is not among them, "[its] procedures are 
similar to those provided by federal law and the laws of other States, and they are not inconsistent with 
the 'traditions and conscience of our people"' (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 
(1992)) (internal citation omitted); see also id. at 2317 (noting Alaska's "widely accepted three-part 
test" governing access to DNA rights). 
90. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,540-41 (1965) (polling states to decide a due process 
challenge to refusal to televise trial); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 118-20 (1934) (polling 
states to determine a due process issue in defendant's inabiliry to be present at view of crime scene). 
91. See, e.g., Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 642 (1991) ("This is not to say that either history 
or current practice is dispositive."); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 (1984) ("The fact that a 
practice is followed by a large number of states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice 
accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the practice 'offends 
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental."' (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952))). 
92. Estes, 381 U.S. at 540 (characterizing the fact that only two states allow the televising of a 
criminal trial as "weighty evidence that our concepts of a fair trial do not tolerate such an indulgence"). 
93. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) ("A rule adopted with such unanimous 
accord ... lends convincing support to the conclusion we have reached as to the fundamental nature 
of that right."). 
94. Schad, 501 U.S. at 643 ("In fine, history and current practice are significant indicators of 
what we as a people regard as fundamentally fair .... "). 
95. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) ("Our primary guide in determining whether 
the principle in question is fundamental is, of course, historical practice."). 
96. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) ("[T]he Constitution contemplates that 
in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death 
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2. Notice and Opportunity To Be Heard 
The Supreme Court's decisionmaking in the context of notice and opportu-
nity to be heard introduces yet another way in which the majority position of 
the states shapes the contours of procedural due process protection: by guiding 
application of a constitutional norm. Granted, this is slightly different from 
what the Court does under the "evolving standards" doctrine, where state 
legislative consensus is used to identify the norm itself. But in the end, the 
result is the same: explicitly majoritarian constitutional protection. 
When considering claims of insufficient notice and/or opportunity to be 
heard, the Supreme Court evaluates the adequacy of procedural protections 
using an interest-balancing approach that in substance (and sometimes name) 
tracks the three-part balancing test enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge.97 Under 
the Mathews balancing test, the Court weighs the government's interest in the 
procedure against the private interests at stake and the likelihood that a differ-
ent procedure would lessen the risk of erroneous deprivation.98 On its face, 
nothing about the Supreme Court's doctrine in this area is majoritarian, yet in 
practice, explicitly majoritarian benchmarks seep into the Court's decisionmak-
ing in several ways. 
Sometimes the Court uses the fact that most states have adopted similar 
procedures as evidence of the importance of the government interest at stake. 
For example, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,99 the Supreme Court used the majority 
position of the states to reject a defendant's due process claim to notice of the 
contents of a child abuse report in a sexual assault case. According to the Court, 
"The importance of the public interest at issue in this case is evidenced by the 
fact that all 50 States and the District of Columbia have statutes that protect 
the confidentiality of their official records concerning child abuse."100 In other 
cases, too, the Court has validated the government's interest in a particular 
procedure by pointing to the legislative position of a majority of states. 101 
penalty under the Eighth Amendment."); accord Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (ZOOS); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,312 (2002). 
97. 424 u.s. 319 (1976). 
98. See id. at 321; see also NOWAK & ROlUNDA, supra note 19, at 636-39, 655 n.77 (discussing 
the Mathews balancing test). 
99. 480 u.s. 39 (1987). 
100. Id. at 60 n.17. 
101. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida 399 U.S. 78, 81--82 (1970) (justifying notice of alibi 
requirement based on the importance of state interest at stake, reasoning that "the State's interest in 
protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense is both obvious and legitimate. Reflecting this 
interest, notice-of-alibi provisions, dating at least from 192 7, are now in existence in a substantial 
number of States." (internal citation omitted)); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 267--68 
(1984) (justifying pretrial detention of juveniles based on the importance of state interest at stake, 
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Conversely, sometimes the Supreme Court uses the fact that most states 
have not adopted similar procedures as evidence of the insufficiency of the 
government interest at stake. For example, in the landmark decision Connecticut 
v. Doehr,102 the Court used the majority position of the states to invalidate a 
statutory scheme that allowed for prejudgment attachment of real estate without 
notice or a showing of exigent circumstances. 103 Rejecting the state's interest 
in the procedure, the Court relied on the fact that "nearly every State requires 
either a preattachment hearing, a showing of some exigent circumstance, or 
both, before permitting an attachment to take place,"104 and attached an appen-
dix to its opinion categorizing the statutes along five different axes. 105 Similarly, 
in Ake v. Oklahoma, 106 the Court relied on over forty state statutes in finding 
that a trial court's refusal to appoint a psychiatrist to support an indigent defen-
dant's mental health claim deprived him of the opportunity to present a fair 
defense, reasoning: 
Oklahoma asserts that to provide Ake with psychiatric assistance on 
the record before us would result in a staggering burden to the State. 
We are unpersuaded by this assertion. Many States, as well as the 
Federal Government, currently make psychiatric assistance available to 
indigent defendants, and they have not found the financial burden so 
great as to preclude this assistance .... We therefore conclude that the 
governmental interest in denying Ake the assistance of a psychiatrist is 
not substantial. 107 
In other cases considering claims of notice and opportunity to be heard, too, 
the Court has relied on what most states do in determining what a state was 
entitled not to. 108 
surveying states and reasoning that "[i]n light of the uniform legislative judgment that pretrial detention 
of juveniles properly promotes the interests both of society and the juvenile, we conclude that the 
practice serves a legitimate regulatory purpose compatible with the 'fundamental fairness' demanded 
by the Due Process Clause in juvenile proceedings"). 
102. 501 u.s. 1 (1991). 
103. Seeid. at 17-18. 
104. Id. at 17. 
105. See id. at 24-25. 
106. 470 u.s. 68 (1985). 
107. Id. at 78--79 (internal citation omitted); see also id. at 79 (noting that "[m]ore than 40 
states, as well as the Federal Government" entitle indigent defendants to a psychiatrist's assistance 
when warranted). 
108. See, e.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1981) (finding a due process violation 
where state forced indigent defendants to pay for cost of paternity test, reasoning: "Moreover, 
following the example of other states, the expense of blood grouping tests for an indigent defendant 
in a Connecticut paternity suit could be advanced by the state and then taxed as costs to the 
parties .... We must conclude that the State's monetary interest 'is hardly significant enough to overcome 
private interests as important as those here."' (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 
28 (1981))); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,484, 488 n.15 (1972) (finding a due process violation 
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Finally, sometimes in these cases, the Supreme Court uses the fact that 
most states have, or have not, adopted similar procedures to assess the risk of 
erroneous deprivation inherent in a particular procedure. In Ake, for exam-
ple, the Court concluded its analysis with the following: 
Last, we inquire into the probable value of the psychiatric assistance 
sought, and the risk of error in the proceeding if such assistance is not 
offered. We begin by considering the pivotal role that psychiatry has 
come to play in criminal proceedings. More than 40 states, as well as 
the Federal Government, have decided either through legislation or 
judicial decision that indigent defendants are entitled, under certain 
circumstances, to the assistance of a psychiatrist's expertise .... These 
statutes and court decisions reflect a reality that we recognize today, 
namely, that when the State has made the defendant's mental condi-
tion relevant to his criminal culpability and to the punishment he 
might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the 
defendant's ability to marshal his defense. 109 
Likewise, in Parham v. ].R.,110 the Court rejected a due process challenge to a 
state's truncated procedure for committing juveniles to state mental hospitals, 
reasoning, "That there may be risks of error in the process affords no rational 
predicate for holding unconstitutional an entire statutory and administrative 
scheme that is generally followed in more than 30 states."111 
In the area of notice and opportunity to be heard, then, the Supreme 
Court uses majoritarian benchmarks to guide its decisionmaking in several 
ways. Again, none of these are exactly what the Court does under "evolving 
standards," but in the larger genre of constitutional decisionmaking, the upshot 
is the same. Whether using the majority position of the states to identify the 
constitutional norm or just apply it, the result is distinctly majoritarian constitu-
tional protection, and deliberately so. 
where state revoked parole without a hearing, reasoning that "most States have recognized that there 
is no interest on the part of the State in revoking parole without any procedural guarantees at all" 
and stating in footnote that "[v]ery few States provide no hearing at all in parole revocations. Thirty 
States provide in their statutes that a parolee shall receive some type of hearing."). 
109. Ake, 470 U.S. at 79--BO. 
110. 442 u.s. 584 (1979). 
111. Id. at 612; see aLso Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,689 (1986) (relying on "statutory 
and decisional law of virtually every State in the Nation" to find that defendant was deprived of an 
opportunity to be heard where the state excluded testimony at trial that called into question the 
reliability of his confession). 
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3. Burdens of Proof 
The Supreme Court's decisionmaking in the burden~of~proof context 
presents a final, and striking, example of its explicitly majoritarian approach 
to procedural due process protection. In this area, the Court has at times 
applied a balancing test, and at times applied its fundamental rights doctrine.112 
The one constant has been the importance of state legislative consensus in 
the Court's burden~of~proof analysis. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Rivera v. Minnich113 illustrates just how 
explicitly majoritarian the Court's approach in this area is. In Rivera, the Court 
upheld a state's use of the preponderance standard for determining paternity, 
relying heavily on the fact that it was "the same standard that is applied in 
paternity litigation in the majority of American jurisdictions."114 Justifying its 
decision, the Court explained: 
A legislative judgment that is not only consistent with the "dominant 
opinion" throughout the country but is also in accord with "the tradi-
tions of our people and our law," is entitled to a powerful presumption 
of validity when it is challenged under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The converse of this proposition is that a 
principal reason for any constitutionally mandated departure from the 
preponderance standard has been the adoption of a more exacting burden 
of proof by the majority of jurisdictions. 115 
The Court then went on to discuss three prior cases in which it had invali-
dated a burden~of~proof standard, emphasizing the importance of the majority 
position of the states in each of those rulings. 116 
As Rivera recognized, the Supreme Court has polled the states in decid~ 
ing a number of other burden~of~proof issues as well. For example, the Court 
counted states when it rejected the preponderance~of~evidence standard in 
112. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754-55 (1982) (using the Mathews balancing 
rest to determine the burden of proof required in a termination of parental rights proceeding); Medina 
v. California, 505 U.S. 437,443-46 (1992) (rejecting the Mathews balancing rest and asking whether 
burden of proof in competency proceedings is fundamental). 
113. 483 u.s. 574 (1987). 
114. Id. at 577-78; see also id. at 579 (relying on "[t]he collective judgment of the many state 
legislatures" in determining what due process requires). 
115. Id. at 578 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes,)., dissenting)). 
116. See id. at 578-79 ("In each of the three cases in which we have held that a standard of 
proof prescribed by a state legislature was unconstitutional, our judgment was consistent with the 
standard imposed by most jurisdictions." (discussing Samosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749 & n.3 
(1997); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,426 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970))). 
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criminal proceedings,m civil commitment proceedings/ 18 and termination of 
parental rights proceedings. 119 The Court counted states when it decided 
burden-of-proof issues relating to surrogate medical decisions120 and a criminal 
defendant's competency.121 And the Court counted states when it resolved 
burden-of-proof questions related to sentencing enhancements122 and criminal 
intent. 123 Although here again, the states' widespread adoption of a particular 
burden of proof is not conclusive in the due process analysis, the Court has 
117. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-62 ("Although virtually unanimous adherence to the 
reasonable-doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it as a requirement 
of due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should 
be enforced and justice administered."' (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968))). 
118. See Addington, 441 U.S. 8t 426 (holding that due process is not satisfied by the preponderance 
of evidence standard in involuntary civil commitment proceedings, noting that "only one state by 
statute permits involuntary commitment by a mere preponderance of the evidence"). 
119. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 749 & n.3 (holding that due process is not satisfied by the 
preponderance of evidence standard in termination of parental rights proceedings, noting, "[t]hirty-
five States, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands currently specify a higher standard of 
proof, in parental rights termination proceedings, than a 'fair preponderance of the evidence"' 
(citations omitted)). 
120. See Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990) (holding that due process 
did not prohibit the state's use of the clear and convincing standard to judge surrogate medical 
decisions, under which oral statements had been found inadequate, and noting that "most, if not all, 
States simply forbid oral testimony entirely in determining the wishes of parties in transactions which, 
while important, simply do not have the consequences that a decision to terminate a person's life 
does"); see also id. at 280 ("Whether or not Missouri's clear and convincing evidence requirement 
comports with the United States Constitution depends in part on what interests the State may properly 
seek to protect in this situation. Missouri relies on its interest in the protection and preservation of 
human life, and there can be no gainsaying this interest. As a general matter, the States--indeed, all 
civilized nations--demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide as a serious crime. 
Moreover, the majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who 
assists another to commit suicide."). 
121. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 360-62 (1996) (holding that due process is 
violated by state procedure requiring defendant to prove incompetence by clear and convincing 
evidence, stating: "Only 4 of the 50 States presently require the criminal defendant to prove his 
incompetence by clear and convincing evidence .... The near-uniform application of a standard 
that is more protective of the defendant's rights than Oklahoma's clear and convincing evidence rule 
supports our conclusion that the heightened standard offends a principle of justice that is deeply 
'rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people."' (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 
445 (1992)); Medina, 505 U.S. at 447-48 (holding that due process is satisfied by state rule imposing 
upon defendant burden of proving incompetency, polling states and concluding that "there remains no 
settled view of where the burden of proof should lie"). 
122. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482-83 (2000) (holding that due process 
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond statutorily 
prescribed maximum, noting "the novelty of a legislative scheme that removes the jury from the 
determination of a fuct that, if found, exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum 
he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone"). 
123. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 696 (1975) (holding that due process is violated by 
state rule imposing upon defendant burden of proving absence of malice, noting that "the large majority 
of States ... now require the prosecution to prove the absence of the heat of passion on sudden 
provocation beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
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emphasized that the consensus view of the states "does reflect a profound judg-
ment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered."n4 
Under the "evolving standards" doctrine, the same legislative consensus amounts 
h. 1 IZ5 to not mg more, or ess. 
II. THE COUNTERMAJORIT ARIAN CONSTITUTION: EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Given the Supreme Court's explicitly majoritarian approach to a variety 
of due process protections, it is tempting to conclude that the Due Process 
Clause is, like the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, more or less an 
anomaly in constitutional law. After all, due process has been called "the 
most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society,"126-a 
depiction not so different from the "evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society" under the Eighth Amendment.127 Yet even 
where the Supreme Court is construing constitutional provisions celebrated for 
countermajoritarian protection-provisions famous for frustrating, rather than 
following, majority will--one can still find striking similarities to what the 
Court does under the "evolving standards" doctrine. The Equal Protection 
Clause and First Amendment, both sources of several of the Supreme Court's 
most famous countermajoritarian rulings,n8 present prime examples. 
A. Equal Protection 
Unlike other constitutional provisions, the Equal Protection Clause con-
tains no substantive guarantee of its own. Rather, its promise is equal treatment 
124. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,361--62 (1970) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 
155 (1968)); accord Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478; Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574,578-79 (1987). 
125. See supra text accompanying note 3 (discussing the role of state legislation in "evolving 
standards" analysis); supra text accompanying note 96 (discussing the Supreme Court's admonition 
that state legislative consensus is not conclusive in "evolving standards" analysis). 
126. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,20--21 (1956) (Frankfurter,]., concurring) ("'Due process' is, 
perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law-the least confined to history and the most absorptive 
of powerful social standards of a progressive society."); accord Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (O'Connor, 
]., concurring). 
127. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) ("The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."). 
128. See, e.g., Brown v. &1. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating racially segregated 
schools under the Equal Protection Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating school 
prayer under the First Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating a state's 
proscription on flag burning under the First Amendment); see also Friedman, supra note 9, at 604 
n.135 ("In the First Amendment context, second perhaps only to small parts of equal protection 
jurisprudence, the Court most unabashedly seems to take on the majority in the name of minority rights."). 
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in whatever substantive guarantees the law otherwise provides.n9 To realize 
this promise, the Supreme Court takes an approach to equal protection almost 
identical to its approach to due process fundamental rights, just slightly more 
elaborate.130 Under the Equal Protection Clause, if a classification burdens a 
fundamental right or suspect class, it must be narrowly tailored to a compelling 
state interest.m If the classification burdens a quasi-suspect class, it must be 
substantially related to an important government interest. 132 And if the classifi-
cation does neither, it need only be rationally related to a legitimate govern-
• 133 
ment mterest. 
Despite their similarities, the Supreme Court's substantive due process 
and equal protection cases tend to exemplify different ways in which the same 
doctrine can be majoritarian. In the substantive due process context, the prime 
conduit for majoritarian decisionmaking is the identification of fundamental 
. h 134 Th Co ' 1 . d . . th 135 b h ng ts. e urt s equa protectlon ectstons use at avenue too, ut ere 
the prime conduit for majoritarian decisionmaking is the application of the 
balancing test framework itself. Granted, this is (again) slightly different from 
what the Court does under "evolving standards," where state legislative consen-
sus is used to identify the constitutional norm, not just apply it. But as in the 
area of notice and opportunity to be heard, the distinction is without much 
difference-both result in explicitly majoritarian constitutional protection. 
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in Heller v. Doe.136 
In Heller, the Court upheld a classification that treated mentally retarded and 
129. See San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
("Unlike other provisions of the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause confers no substantive 
rights and creates no substantive liberties. The function of the Equal Protection Clause, rather, is 
simply to measure the validity of classifications created by state laws."). 
130. See generally NOWAK&ROTUNDA, supra note 19, at 429 (comparing provisions). 
131. See (ironically) Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("It should be 
noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say 
that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes 
justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can."); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, 
supra note 19, at 687-88 (discussing the strict scrutiny standard and its application to classifications 
based on race or national origin); id. at 751-52 (discussing Korematsu's introduction of the strict 
scrutiny standard). 
132. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (articulating intermediate scrutiny standard); 
see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 19, at 688 (discussing the intermediate scrutiny standard and 
its application to classifications based on gender or illegitimacy). 
133. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1993) (discussing the rational basis standard); 
see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 19, at 429, 687 (same). 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23. 
135. Compare, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 804-05 (1997) (relying on the majority 
position of the states to find no fundamental right to assisted suicide under equal protection analysis), 
with Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (relying on the same under due process analysis). 
136. 509 u.s. 312. 
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mentally ill persons differently for the purposes of involuntary commitment, 
relying in part on the fact that "[a] large majority of states have separate 
involuntary commitment laws for the two groups."137 According to the Court, 
"That the law has long treated the classes as distinct suggests that there is a 
commonsense distinction" along the lines that the classification has drawn. 138 
In other cases, too, the Supreme Court has relied on a consensus among 
the states to validate a classification. In San Anwnio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez,139 for example, the Court upheld a state's unequal allocation of 
funding among school districts, reasoning: 
The District Court found that the State had failed even "to establish a 
reasonable basis" for a system that results in different levels of per-pupil 
expenditure. We disagree. In its reliance on state as well as local 
resources, the Texas system is comparable to the systems employed in 
virtually every other State.140 
And in Vacca v. Quill/41 the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to 
a state's ban on assisted suicide, relying on the fact that "the overwhelming 
majority of state legislatures have drawn a clear line between assisting suicide 
and withdrawing or permitting the refusal of unwanted lifesaving medical 
treatment."142 In these decisions and others/43 what proved a classification legiti-
mate was its use in a majority of states. 
The reverse is also true. The Supreme Court has instructed that "[d]iscrimi-
nations of unusual character" be carefully considered, even under rational basis 
137. Id. at 327-28,328 n.3 (applying rational basis review). 
138. Id. at 326. 
139. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
140. Id. at 47--48 (applying rational basis review). 
141. 521 u.s. 793 (1997). 
142. Id. at 80~5 (applying rational basis review); see also supra note 135 (discussing Vacca's 
use of the majority position of the states to reject the claim that assisted suicide is a fundamental 
right under Equal Protection Clause). 
143. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 325 n.4 (1983) (rejecting equal protection 
challenge to residency requirement for tuition-free public schooling and noting that "[t]he vast majority 
of the States have some residence requirements governing entitlement to tuition-free public schooling"); 
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 72 (1978) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to 
the state's creation of political subdivisions, explaining, "[i]n this country 35 States authorize their 
municipal subdivisions to exercise governmental powers beyond their corporate limits"); Sosna 
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 40~5 (1975) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to residency requirement 
for divorce, reasoning that "[t]he imposition of a durational residency requirement for divorce is scarcely 
unique to Iowa, since 48 States impose such a requirement as a condition for maintaining an action 
for divorce"); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583-84 (1964) ("Decennial reapportionment appears 
to be a rational approach to readjustment of legislative representation in order to take into account 
population shifts and growth. Reallocation of legislative seats every 10 years coincides with the 
prescribed practice in 41 of the States .... (I]f reapportionment were accomplished with less frequency, 
it would assuredly be constitutionally suspect."). 
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review,144 and has invalidated a number of outlier classifications on that basis. 
From the poll tax/45 to gender restrictions in the sale of alcohol, 146 to a state 
constitutional amendment targeting sexual orientation, 147 to other sex and 
race classifications,148 the Court has used the majority position of the states 
to determine the minimum that equal protection requires. 
Given the conventional understanding of the Equal Protection Clause 
as a bastion for minority rights, 149 the Supreme Court's reliance on state legisla-
tive consensus in this area may come as a surprise. But upon reflection, perhaps 
it shouldn't. On the surface, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that like 
persons be treated alike. Yet underlying the apparent simplicity of that com-
mand are more difficult questions about what differences matter when-and 
those are questions with no ready answers. As Peter Westen recognized years 
ago, equality is an "empty idea" on its own, a precept that means nothing absent 
the value judgments used to fill it. 150 In the end, those value judgments have 
to come from somewhere. Here, too, the majority position of the states is an 
obvious (and oft-used) choice. 
144. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (justifying careful scrutiny under rational 
basis review). 
145. See Harper v. Va. Bel. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 n.4 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax 
under the Equal Protection Clause, noting that "[o)nly a handful of States today condition the 
franchise on the payment of a poll tax"). 
146. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208 n.22 (1976) (invalidating gender distinctions in 
state regulation of sale of alcohol, stating that "[t)he repeal of most of these laws signals society's perception 
of the unfairness and questionable constitutionality of singling out groups to bear the brunt of alcohol 
regulation"); id. at 212 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Apparently Oklahoma is the only State to 
permit this narrow discrimination to survive .... "). 
147. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (invalidating a state constitutional amendment prohibiting 
protection on the basis of sexual orientation, relying in part on the fact that it was "unprecedented"). 
148. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 147 n.3 (1980) (invalidating 
gender distinctions for surviving spouse benefits, noting that "[t)he workers' compensation laws of the 
vast majority of States now make no distinction between the eligibility of widows and widowers for 
death benefits"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 & n.5 (1967) (invalidating a miscegenation 
statute, noting that "Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on the 
basis of racial classifications" and that "[o)ver the past 15 years, 14 States have repealed laws 
outlawing interracial marriages"); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,357 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (opining that in the affirmative action context, "circumstantial 
evidence as to whether a state activity is of pressing public necessity can be obtained by asking 
whether all States feel compelled to engage in that activity"); J .E. B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 12 7, 144 
(1994) (invalidating gender-based preemptory challenges, stating that "[t)he experience in the many 
jurisdictions that have barred gender-based challenges belies the claim that litigants and trial courts 
are incapable of complying with a rule barring strikes based on gender"). 
149. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
150. See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). 
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B. First Amendment 
Unlike the elusive Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment is 
written in unequivocal terms. Yet despite its opening command, "Congress 
shall make no law,"151 the First Amendment's protection of religion and free 
speech has not proven to be absolute. Here, too, the Court's jurisprudence is 
chock full of line drawing and limitations, with examples of explicitly majori-
tarian decisionmaking at nearly every tum. 
In the religion context, the Supreme Court has resolved the tension 
between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause by steering a 
course of basic religious neutrality.152 In practice, that means a government 
regulation can neither benefit nor burden religion (at least not on purposer 51 
unless doing so is necessary to promote a compelling state or federal interest.154 
As was true in the equal protection context, the Court's interest-balancing 
approach to religious freedom inevitably requires judgments about the sufficiency 
of the government interest at stake and the legitimacy of the means used to 
serve it. 155 And as was true in the equal protection context, the Court commonly 
counts states in conducting its analysis. 
A number of cases illustrate the point. For example, the Supreme Court 
relied on the majority position of the states when it upheld Sunday closing laws156 
151. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press .... "). 
15 2. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 19, at 1408 (discussing the neutrality principle); see 
also supra text accompanying note 151 (quoting both clauses). 
153. See Employment Oiv., Oep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878--89 
(1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit governmental burden on religion 
where the law is neutral and of general applicability, and was not intended to burden religious 
practice); accord Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); 
see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690--91 (2005) (noting that "[s]imply having religious 
content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the 
Establishment Clause," at least without an "improper and plainly religious purpose"). 
154. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-
32 (1993) ("[A) law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious 
practice .... A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest."); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, 
supra note 19, at 1408--09 (discussing the compelling interest test). 
155. See supra Part !LA (discussing the equal protection doctrine and the Supreme Court's use 
of majoritarian benchmarks in applying it). 
156. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 435 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws, 
stating, "(a)lmost every state in our country presently has some type of Sunday regulation and over 
forty possess a relatively comprehensive system"). 
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and a tax exemption for churches.157 The Court counted states when it refused 
to bar opening prayers in legislative assemblies158 and when it invalidated a 
rule that barred ministers from serving as delegates. 159 And the Court counted 
states when it struck down a school district boundary that tracked denomina-
tionallines.160 On each of these occasions, the Court used the majority position 
of the states to determine the reach of First Amendment protection. 
In the free speech context, the Supreme Court's decisionmaking is 
explicitly majoritarian in yet another way. Here, too, the Court uses an interest-
balancing approach, and one can readily find examples of state polling within 
that analysis.161 But in addition to that approach, the Court also makes threshold 
determinations about whether certain categories of speech are outside the ambit 
of First Amendment protection altogether162-and these determinations likewise 
showcase the Court drawing the lines of First Amendment protection in a 
distinctly majoritarian manner. 
157. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (upholding a state tax 
exemption for realty owned for religious purposes, stating, "All of the 50 States provide for tax exemption 
of places of worship, most of them doing so by constitutional guarantees .... Few concepts are more 
deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life .... "). 
158. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788-89, 794 (1983) (upholding the state practice 
of opening a legislative session with a prayer by a chaplain paid from public funds, noting that the 
practice has "been followed consistently in most of the states" and that "many state legislatures and 
the United States Congress provide compensation for their chaplains"). 
159. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (invalidating a state provision barring 
ministers from serving as delegates, noting that "[t]oday Tennessee remains the only State excluding 
ministers from certain public offices"). 
160. See Bel. ofEduc. ofKiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 701 (1994) (invali-
dating a school district that tracked denominational lines, noting that it was "exceptional to the point 
of singularity"). 
161. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 353-54, 370 (1997) 
(upholding a ban on so-called "fusion" candidates under interest balancing test, beginning opinion 
with the statement, "Most States prohibit multiple-party, or 'fusion,' candidacies for elected office," 
and concluding that "the Constitution does not require Minnesota, and the approximately 40 other 
States that do not permit fusion, to allow it"); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 568 
(1991) (upholding a public indecency statute under interest balancing test, noting that "[p]ublic 
indecency statutes of this sort are of ancient origin and presently exist in at least 47 States"); 
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 223 n.12 (1986) (invalidating a closed primary 
statute under an interest balancing test, noting "that appellant's direst predictions about destruction 
of the integrity of the election process and decay of responsible party government are not borne out 
by the experience of the 29 States which have chosen to permit more substantial openness in their 
primary systems than Connecticut has permitted heretofore"); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San 
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) (upholding a billboard regulation under an interest balancing test, 
noting that "the [legislative] judgment involved here is not so unusual as to raise suspicions in itself' 
and that the regulation at issue was "like many States"). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra 
note 19, at 1130-43 (discussing various categories of speech and the different interest-balancing tests 
used to evaluate restrictions on them). 
162. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,383 (1992) (noting that "a limited categorical 
approach has remained an important part of our First Amendment jurisprudence"). 
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According to the Supreme Court, "There are certain well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which 
has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."163 So how do we 
know when we are dealing with one of those classes? On a number of occasions, 
the Court's answer has involved polling the states. For example, when the 
Court excluded libel from First Amendment protection, it justified its decision 
with the recognition that "[t]oday, every American jurisdiction-the forty-eight 
States, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico--punish[es] 
libels directed at individuals."164 Similarly, when the Court excluded child 
pornography from First Amendment protection, it began the analysis with a 
detailed breakdown of similar state statutes, ultimately concluding: 
The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes 
a government objective of surpassing importance .... Suffice it to say that 
virtually all of the States and the United States have passed legislation 
proscribing the production of or otherwise combating "child pornogra-
phy." ... That judgment, we think easily passes muster under the First 
Amendment. 165 
Likewise, when the Court excluded obscenity from First Amendment protec-
tion, it cited "the universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, 
reflected in the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity 
laws of all of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the 
Congress from 1842 to 1956."166 In each of these cases, the Court did just 
what it does under "evolving standards": it made a categorical ruling based on 
the one the states had made on their own. 
Upon reflection, both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection 
Clause present intriguing examples of explicitly majoritarian decisionmaking 
outside the Eighth Amendment. Granted, the Supreme Court's reliance on state 
legislative consensus in both areas is less formalized, and less prevalent, than 
what one sees in the due process arena. And granted, the Court in both areas 
generally uses the states to apply the constitutional norm, rather than identify it 
163. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); accord Virginia v. Black, 
538 U.S. 343,358 (2003); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,485 (1957). 
164. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255 (1952). 
165. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757-58 (1982). 
166. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485. Indeed, in the obscenity context, the Supreme Coun takes the 
notion of explicitly majoritarian protection to a whole new level. Not only has the Coun excluded 
obscenity from First Amendment protection based on the majority position of the states, but it has 
used the majority position of each locality--"contemporary community standards"-to define obscenity 
in the first place. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973); see aLso id. at 44 (lliuglas, j., dissenting) 
(''To give the power to the censor, as we do today, is to make a sharp and radical break with the 
traditions of a free society."). 
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in the first place. 167 But it is nevertheless remarkable that even when the Court 
is construing provisions famous for countermajoritarian protection, 168 its deci-
sionmaking is still riddled with majoritarian benchmarks, resulting in explicitly 
majoritarian constitutional protection. 
III. THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT: FOURTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS 
In the final leg of this doctrinal tour, I tum to the criminal context, yet 
another area where the Supreme Court has been credited for protecting minor-
ity rights from the vagaries of majority will.169 Here I examine the Court's 
decisionmaking under the Fourth and Sixth Amendments, both of which 
present striking examples of state polling outside the Eighth Amendment. 
Consider first the Fourth Amendment. 
A. Fourth Amendment 
Nothing about the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against "unreason-
bl h d 0 ,170 0 h f 0 r: a e searc es an setzures necessitates t e sort o state nose-countmg 10r 
which the "evolving standards" doctrine is famous, yet here, too, the Supreme 
Court's decisionmaking is explicitly majoritarian. Those who now know the drill 
(and Fourth Amendment doctrine) might surmise that the Court counts states 
when deciding whether a defendant has a constitutionally cognizable expecta-
tion of privacy-the threshold determination for Fourth Amendment search 
claims.171 After all, the Court has clarified that the Fourth Amendment does 
not protect aU expectations of privacy, only those "that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable."m Thus far, however, this threshold inquiry for Fourth 
Amendment protection has not given rise to the same state polling we see in 
167. The Court's use of state legislative consensus to make categorical exclusions to First 
Amendment protection in the free speech context presents a conspicuous exception. See supra notes 
163-166 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra text accompanying note 128 (referencing the Supreme Court's desegregation, school 
prayer, and flag burning cases). 
169. Lain, supra note 65, at 1363-64 (discussing widely held view of Supreme Court's 1960s 
criminal procedure decisions as "the quintessential example of the Supreme Court playing a heroic, 
countermajoritarian role"). 
170. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "). 
171. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("For the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, 
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in 
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."). 
172. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); accord Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334,338 (2000); 
Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91,95-96 (1990); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.l2 (1978). 
396 57 UCLA LAW REVIEW 365 (2009) 
the Eighth Amendment context, despite its expression in seemingly majori-
tarian terms. Instead, the Court surveys the states to determine what the Fourth 
Amendment requires after the threshold showing for Fourth Amendment 
protection has been made. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Payton v. New York173 provides a fitting 
example. In Payton, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
warrantless entry into the home to make a routine felony arrest.174 To reach 
its decision, the Court conducted a three-part analysis, considering first, well-
settled common law; second, "the clear consensus among the States"; and 
third, expressions of Congress on the issue.175 In its section discussing the states, 
the Court explained: 
A longstanding, widespread practice is not immune from constitu-
tional scrutiny. But neither is it to be lightly brushed aside. This is 
particularly so when the constitutional standard is as amorphous as the 
word "reasonable," and when custom and contemporary norms neces-
sarily play such a large role in the constitutional analysis. 176 
The Court then went on to distinguish the issue in Payton-warrantless arrests 
in the home-from "the kind of virtual unanimity" that supported the absence 
of a warrant requirement for felony arrests in public, 177 using an approach 
almost identical to its analysis under "evolving standards." First the Court 
counted states, then it recognized a legislative trend in one direction, and then 
finally it discussed why "the strength of the trend is greater than the numbers 
l · d. "178 I R s· 179 th 2005 " l . d d " a one m teate. n oper v. zmmons - e evo vmg stan ar s case 
that invalidated the juvenile death penalty-the Court's analysis moved in 
the exact same lockstep fashion. 180 
In other Fourth Amendment cases, too, the Supreme Court has formally 
recognized the importance of state counting in identifying the constitutional 
norm. In Tennessee v. Gamer/ 81 for example, the Court began its discussion 
of the state legislative landscape with the statement, "In evaluating the rea-
sonableness of police procedures under the Fourth Amendment, we have also 
173. 445 u.s. 573 (1980). 
174. Id. at 602-()3. 
175. See id. at 590-603. 
176. ld. at 600. 
177. !d. (discussing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 ( 1976) ). 
178. Id. 
179. 543 u.s. 551 (2005). 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 26-31 (discussing the analysis in Roper and comparing 
the analysis in the "evolving standards" and the substantive due process fundamental rights context). 
181. 471 u.s. 1 (1985). 
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looked to prevailing rules in individual jurisdictions."182 Similarly, in Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista,'83 the Court parroted back Justice O'Connor's admonition in 
Gamer that courts should be "reluctant" to invalidate under the Fourth 
Amendment a historically accepted practice that "has continued to receive 
h f l . l ,184 t e support o many state egts atures. 
Applying these principles has led the Supreme Court to explicitly majori-
tarian rulings on a number of key Fourth Amendment issues. For example, 
the Court counted states in its landmark ruling on excessive force. 185 Likewise, 
it counted states when deciding Fourth Amendment challenges to "knock 
d " d 186 l 187 l d . . . an announce proce ures, warrant ess arrests, warrant ess a mmtstrauve 
searches,188 and arrests for nonjailable offenses.189 On each of these issues, what 
struck the Court as "reasonable" was what the majority of states considered the 
term to mean. 
B. Sixth Amendment 
The Sixth Amendment provides a final, and compelling, example of ex-
plicitly majoritarian doctrine outside the Eighth Amendment. By its own terms, 
the Sixth Amendment's protections apply "[i]n all criminal prosecutions."190 
But as it turns out, "all" does not mean all. 191 According to the Supreme Court, 
182. Id. at 15-16. 
183. 532 u.s. 318 (2001). 
184. Id. at 345 n.14 (quoting Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 26 (1985) (O'Connor,]., 
dissenting)); see also infra text note 189 (quoting state counting in Atwater). 
185. See Gamer, 471 U.S. at 18 (finding a Fourth Amendment violation where police used deadly 
force against nonviolent felon, stating, "the long-term movement has been away from the rule that 
deadly force may be used against any fleeing felon, and that remains the rule in less than half the 
States"). For an excellent discussion of rnajoritarian doctrine in the excessive force context, see generally 
Winter, supra note 9. 
186. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 933-34 (1995) (recognizing "knock and announce" 
as a Fourth Amendment requirement "embedded in Anglo-American law"). 
187. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1976) (recognizing the validity of 
warrantless arrest in public, stating, "The balance struck by the common law in generally authorizing 
felony arrests on probable cause, but without a warrant, has survived substantially intact. It appears 
in almost all of the States in the form of express statutory authorization."). 
188. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 698 n.l1 (1987) (recognizing validity of warrantless 
administrative search of vehicle-dismantling business, stating "Numerous States have provisions for 
the warrantless inspections of vehicle dismantlers and automobile junkyards," and citing thirty-
eight state statutes). 
189. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 320, 344 {upholding arrest for nonjailable offense, stating, "today 
statutes in all 50 States and the District of Columbia permit warrantless misdemeanor arrests by at 
least some (if not all) peace officers without requiring any breach of the peace, as do a host of congressional 
enactments," and attaching an appendix). 
190. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. 
191. Barty Friedman has made the same point. See Friedman, supra note 9, at 593-94 (noting 
in the Sixth Amendment context that '"all' turns out not to mean all: it just means some"). 
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"all" actually means some, and here again the Court uses the majority position 
of the states to draw the lines of constitutional protection. 
The right to jury is a prime example. For more than seventy years now, 
the Supreme Court has looked to the states to determine which jury practices 
are constitutionally required and which are not. In District of Columbia v. 
Clawans, 192 for example, the Court instructed that "objective standards such 
as may be observed in the laws and practices of the community" guide the 
jury trial analysis.193 In Duncan v. Louisiana/94 the Court reiterated this instruc-
tion, stressing the importance of "objective criteria, chiefly the existing laws 
and practices in the Nation."195 To death penalty scholars, that phraseology 
should sound familiar-it is nearly identical to what the Court has said when 
applying the "evolving standards" doctrine.196 
In other cases, too, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of 
a state legislative consensus in its jury trial analysis. In Burch v. Louisiana,197 
for example, the Court used the majority position of the states to invalidate 
nonunanimous six-member juries.198 Justifying its decision, the Court explained: 
It appears that of those States that utilize six-member juries in trials of 
nonpetty offenses, only two, including Louisiana, also allow nonunani-
mous verdicts. We think that this near-uniform judgment of the Nation 
provides a useful guide in delimiting the line between those jury practices 
that are constitutionally permissible and those that are not. 199 
Similarly, in Baldwin v. New York,200 the Court used the majority position of 
the states to determine whether a potential one-year sentence was sufficiently 
severe to trigger the right to jury.201 Rejecting offhand New York's proposed 
192. 300U.S.617(1937). 
193. I d. at 628 ("Doubts must be resolved, not subjectively by recourse of the judge to his own 
sympathy and emotions, but by objective standards such as may be observed in the laws and practices 
of the community taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments."). 
194. 391 u.s. 145 (1968). 
195. Id. at 161 ("In determining whether the length of the authorized prison term or the seriousness 
of other punishment is enough in itself to require a jury trial, we are counseled by Disr:ricr of Columbia 
v. Clawaru .. . to refer to objective criteria, chiefly the existing laws and practices in the Nation." (citing 
Clawans, 300 U.S. at 628)). 
196. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (stating in "evolving standards" context 
that "[t]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation 
enacted by the country's legislatures"); accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,312 (2002). I made a 
similar point in Part I of this Article. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24 (discussing reliance 
on state legislation in the "evolving standards" and substantive due process contexts). 
197. 441 u.s. 130 (1979). 
198. Id. at 138-39. 
199. I d. at 138. 
200. 399 u.s. 66 (1970). 
201. I d. at 70. 
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analysis, the Court instructed, "A better guide '(i)n determining whether the 
length of the authorized prison term or the seriousness of other punishment is 
enough in itself to require a jury trial' is disclosed by 'the existing laws and 
practices in the Nation."'202 In these cases and others, the Court did just what 
it does under the "evolving standards doctrine"-survey the states and follow 
the national norm. 203 
In other Sixth Amendment contexts, too, one can readily find examples 
of explicitly majoritarian decisionmaking. For instance, the Supreme Court 
has polled the states to decide questions concerning the right to a speedy 
· 1 204 • h bl' · l 205 d · h . . 1 . 206 I h 11 d tna, ng t to a pu 1c tna , an ng t to an tmparua Jury. t as po e 
the states to decide questions regarding the right to compulsory process207 and the 
scope of the Confrontation Clause.208 Just last term, the Court polled the states 
202. ld. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968)). 
203. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607--09 (2002) (finding a violation of Sixth 
Amendment right to jury where sentencing judge, rather than jury, found aggravating factors to 
support death sentence, noting that "the great majority of states" entrust such findings to the jury and 
that "other than Arizona, only four states" allow the judge to make such determinations); Ballew v. 
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 244 (1978) (invalidating a five-member jury under Sixth Amendment, 
noting that "only two States, Georgia and Virginia, have reduced the size of juries in certain nonpetry 
criminal cases to five"); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 122 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(lamenting the majority's decision to uphold a six-member jury under Sixth Amendment, noting that 
"[r]ather than bind the States by the hitherto undeviating and unquestioned federal practice of 12-
member juries, the Court holds, based on a poll of state practice, that a six-man jury satisfies the 
guarantee of a trial by jury in a federal criminal system and consequently carries over to the States"). 
For an excellent (and the only other) discussion of majoritarian doctrine in the Sixth Amendment 
right to jury context, see Friedman, supra note 9, at 593-98. 
204. See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 220 n.S (1967) (invalidating an indefinite 
nolle prosequi procedure as violating the right to a speedy trial, noting that "only North Carolina and 
Pennsylvania have held that a nolle prossed indictment could be reinstated at a subsequent term"). 
205. See, e.g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 388 n.19 (1979) (rejecting claim 
that members of the public have a right to access criminal trials, noting that "[a]pproximately half the 
States also have statutory prohibitions containing limitations upon public trials"). 
206. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,533 (1975) ("If the fair-cross-section rule is to 
govern the selection of juries, as we have concluded it must, women cannot be systematically excluded 
from jury panels from which petit juries are drawn. This conclusion is consistent with the current 
judgment of the country, now evidenced by legislative or constitutional provisions in every State and 
at the federal level qualifying women for jury service."). 
207. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 n.4 (1967) (finding a violation of compulsory 
process where a state statute prevented defendant from placing an accomplice on the stand, noting 
that "[c]ounsel have cited no statutes from other jurisdictions, and we have found none, that flatly 
disqualify coparticipants in a crime from testifying for each other regardless of whether they are tried 
jointly or separately"). 
208. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853-54 (1990) (holding that the Confrontation 
Clause did not categorically prohibit child sexual assault testimony via one-way closed circuit television, 
explaining: "We likewise conclude today that a State's interest in the physical and psychological 
well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a 
defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court. That a significant majority of States have enacted 
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to decide when the right to counsel attaches, relying on "the overwhelming 
consensus practice" of forty-three states.209 In each of these areas, the Court 
demonstrated what every preschooler already knows: line-drawing is easiest 
when tracing lines already there.210 
IV. QUALIFICATIONS, EXPLANATIONS, IMPLICATIONS 
Thus far, the analysis has aimed at proving the existence of explicitly 
majoritarian decisionmaking outside the Eighth Amendment. We see it in the 
many meanings of due process, we see it in areas famous for countermajoritarian 
protection like the Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment, and we 
see it in the criminal context. I now turn to a discussion of these findings, 
qualifying my analysis and sharing initial thoughts about the explanations and 
implications of state polling as a larger doctrinal phenomenon. 
A. Qualifications 
The aim of this section is to refine my claim so that it appears no bigger, 
or smaller, than it is. Four points merit mention. 
First, the discussion above is not meant to suggest that the Supreme Court 
always polls the states in its constitutional decisionmaking, or even that it 
does so most of the time. In the end, the frequency, and formality, with which 
the Court polls the states depends on the constitutional context. In some 
areas-substantive due process protection of fundamental rights comes to 
mind-the doctrine is just as patently majoritarian and formally entrenched 
as "evolving standards."211 In other areas-equal protection is a nice example-
the doctrine is majoritarian not as stated, but as applied, and the state polling 
is more sporadic.212 Even within constitutional contexts, the cases differ in the 
amount of attention the Court gives to its state polling analysis. In some 
statutes to protect child witnesses from the trauma of giving testimony in child abuse cases attests to 
the widespread belief in the importance of such a public policy."). 
209. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2586--87 (2008) ("[T)he overwhelming 
consensus practice conforms to the rule that the first formal proceeding is the point of attachment. 
We are advised without contradiction that not only the Federal Government, including the District 
of Columbia, but 43 States take the first step toward appointing counsel 'before, at, or just after initial 
appearance."' (citation omitted)); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27 n.l (1972) (holding 
that no person may be imprisoned without the right to counsel, noting that "[o]verall, 31 States have 
now extended the right [of counsel] to defendants charged with crimes less serious than felonies"). 
210. I credit Jessica Lain for this insight, based on empirical study. 
211. See supra Part l.A.1 (discussing majoritarian doctrine in the context of substantive due 
process protection of fundamental rights). 
212. See supra Part Part ll.A (discussing equal protection doctrine). 
The Unexceptionalism of "Evolving Standards" 401 
cases, the discussion is extensive; it is not uncommon to see an appendix to 
the Court's opinion cataloguing the positions of the states.213 In others, the 
majority position of the states is presented more as a statement of fact, with 
little to no accompanying discussion.214 
In short, there are substantial variations in just how much the Supreme 
Court's decisionmaking outside the Eighth Amendment resembles what it does 
under "evolving standards." But the basic point remains. Contrary to what schol-
ars think the Justices are doing215 -and contrary to what the Justices themselves 
have said they do216-the Supreme Court routinely, and explicitly, uses the 
majority position of the states to determine the content of constitutional law. 
Second, none of this is to say that the Supreme Court's use of state 
legislative consensus outside the Eighth Amendment is any less subject to 
manipulation than it is within the Eighth Amendment. On a few occasions 
213. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 355-60 (2001) (appendix surveying 
state statutes on warrantless misdemeanor arrests); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1991) 
(appendix surveying state statutes on prejudgment attachment); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 
224-25 (1960) (appendix surveying states on exclusionary rule); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29-30 
(1949) (same); see aLso Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 138-43 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (appendix surveying states on right to jury issues). 
214. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 933-34 (1995) (recognizing "knock and 
announce" as a Fourth Amendment requirement "embedded in Anglo-American law"); Parham v. J.R., 
442 U.S. 584, 612 (1979) (upholding state procedures for involuntary commitment of juveniles under 
Due Process Clause, explaining "[t]hat there may be risks of error in the process affords no rational 
predicate for holding unconstitutional an entire statutory and administrative scheme that is generally 
followed in more than 30 states"); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 244-45 (1978) (invalidating a five-
member jury under the Sixth Amendment, noting that "only two States, Georgia and Virginia, have 
reduced the size of juries in certain nonpetty criminal cases to five"); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 
404 (1965) ("mhe right of confrontation [i]s 'one of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty,' 
and ... 'guarded against legislative and judicial action by provisions in the Constitution of the United 
States and in the constitutions of most, if not of all, the States composing the Union."' (quoting Kirby v. 
United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55-56 (1899))); see aLso infra text accompanying note 218 (discussing the 
absence of state counting altogether in areas where the Supreme Court's articulation of the constitutional 
standard appears to invite it). 
215. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing widespread perception among death 
penalty scholars in particular, and larger academy in general, that the Supreme Court's reliance on state 
legislative consensus to determine constitutional protection is limited to Eighth Amendment "cruel and 
unusual punishments" context). 
216. See, e.g., W.Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,638 (1943) ("The very purpose 
of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied 
by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship 
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome 
of no elections."); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560 (1923) ("The elucidation of [a constitu-
tional] question cannot be aided by counting heads."); see aLso Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 999-1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("How upsetting it is that so many of our 
citizens ... think that we Justices should properly take into account their views, as though we were engaged 
not in ascertaining an objective law but in determining some kind of social consensus."). 
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outside the "evolving standards" context, the Court appears to have manipu-
lated the state count, couching the question in a particularly broad or narrow 
fashion to make the numbers come out right.217 On other occasions, also rela-
tively few, the Court simply ruled the other way, leaving majoritarian arguments 
to the dissent.218 Both phenomena suggest that the Supreme Court's state 
polling exercises outside the Eighth Amendment are just a doctrinal fa<;ade 
designed to take the Justices where they (already) want to go. And that may 
well be. But the same could be said-and has been--of the "evolving standards" 
doctrine too.119 
217. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2631-32 (2008) (acknowledging 
that "a slim majority of the States with a [punitive damages-to-actual harm] ratio have adopted 3:1" 
but concluding, "[t]hus, a legislative judgment that 3:1 is a reasonable limit overall is not a judgment 
that 3:1 is a reasonable limit in this particular type of case"); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 
126-27 (1989) (acknowledging that almost all states recognize right of natural parent to assert 
paternity but distinguishing that right, stating: "What Michael asserts here is a right to have himself 
declared the natural father and tkreby to obtain parental prerogatives. What he must establish, therefore, 
is not that our society has traditionally allowed a natural father in his circumstances to establish 
paternity, but that it has traditionally accorded such a father parental rights, or at least has not 
traditionally denied them."); id. at 137-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority's manipula-
tion of tradition and "level of generality"). 
218. Most often (but not always), this occurs when the Court's protection lags behind that of 
the states. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 492 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
("First, the experience of other jurisdictions, and California itself, belies the plurality's conclusion 
that a gender-neutral statutory rape law 'may well be incapable of enforcement.' There are now at 
least 37 States that have enacted gender-neutral statutory rape laws."); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 
385-88 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Perhaps the strongest refutation of respondent's alarmist 
prophecies that an authorized imprisonment standard would wreak havoc on the States is that the standard 
has not produced that result in the substantial number of States that already provide counsel in all 
cases where imprisonment is authorized .... In fact, Scott would be entitled to appointed counsel under 
the current laws of at least 33 States."); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 326 n.6 (1976) 
(Marshall, J ., dissenting) ("Appellee has produced a study of the laws of the 50 States that shows that 
Massachusetts' age-50 retirement law prescribes the earliest retirement age in the Nation, and that no 
other State requires its state police to retire before age 55. In short, I refuse to hypothesize that testing 
after age 50 loses its predictive ability when the appellants have introduced absolutely nothing that 
supports this position."); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 614-15 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
("It is true, I suppose, that the granting of [a religious] exemption [to Sunday closing laws] would make 
Sundays a little noisier, and the task of police and prosecutor a little more difficult. It is also true that 
a majority-21--of the 34 States which have general Sunday regulations have exemptions of this 
kind. We are not told that those States are significantly noisier, or that their police are significantly 
more burdened, than Pennsylvania's."); cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,429 (1989) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting) ("!cannot agree that the First Amendment invalidates the Act of Congress, and the laws 
of 48 of the 50 States, which make criminal the public burning of the flag."). For an explanation of this 
phenomenon, see infra note 253 and accompanying text. 
219. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 25-35 (2007) (deconstructing 
the "evolving standards" doctrine to show result-oriented manipulation of state polling data, using the 
death penalty for juveniles and mentally retarded offenders as examples); Jacobi, supra note 1, at 1123-
49 (discussing in depth the "junk social science of counting state legislation"). Indeed, the same could 
be said of the entire body of constitutional law. See Lawrence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN 
BAG 20. 291, 292, 295 (2005) (open letter from Tribe announcing his decision to suspend work on 
The Unexceptionalism of "Evolving Standards" 403 
That said, it is more difficult to write off the Supreme Court's reliance on 
state legislative consensus in some doctrinal areas than others. Where the Court 
has formally recognized the importance of the majority position of the states in its 
doctrinal analysis, as it does when state legislative consensus identifies the consti-
tutional norm, one might plausibly accuse the Court of manipulating the state 
count-but not of manipulating the existence of state counting altogether. The 
Court's doctrines in the areas of fundamental rights (both substantive and 
procedural varieties), selective incorporation, punitive damages, burdens of proof, 
and the Fourth and Sixth Amendments present prime examples. 
In other areas, where the Court uses state counting to apply an already 
identified constitutional norm, it is concededly difficult to make the same claim. 
Here the most one can say is that even where state polling is not formally 
entrenched, the Court engages in it on a regular basis-and it does so with no 
apparent predilection for validating or invalidating a challenged practice.220 
The Court's decisions in the areas of notice and opportunity to be heard, equal 
protection, and the First Amendment illustrate this subset of cases. Again, there 
are substantial variations as to how close the Court's decisionmaking outside 
the Eighth Amendment resembles what it does inside the Eighth Amendment, 
and that goes for doctrinal manipulation too. 
Third, thus far I have characterized the Supreme Court's reliance on 
state legislative consensus as majoritarian, but that is not necessarily the case. State 
legislation presumably reflects the views of a democratic majority, but whether 
that majority is also a contemporary majority at the time of the Court's ruling is 
a separate question. State laws likely reflect the views of a number of different 
majorities, depending on when they were enacted, and their endurance over 
time likely says as much about the difficulty of repeal as it does support for 
the second volume of his constitutional law treatise based on "conflict over basic constitutional prem-
ises" and "profound doubts whether any new synthesis ... is possible at present"). 
220. Professor Roderick Hills has argued that the Supreme Court's state polling exercises are 
consistent with federalism principles because the Court tends to use state legislative consensus to 
preserve, rather than invalidate, a challenged state practice. See Hills, supra note 9. I respectfully 
disagree with this assessment. In many cases {including those in which state counting is not formally 
entrenched as identifying the constitutional norm and is thus more susceptible to result-oriented 
manipulation), the Supreme Court has used the rnajoriry position of the states to invalidate, as well as 
validate, state legislation. See supra notes 99-103, 105, 107 {discussing cases where the Supreme Court 
used state legislative consensus to invalidate legislation in the context of notice and opportunity to be 
heard); 140-143 {discussing same in equal protection context); 155-156, 158 {same in First Amendment 
context). In fairness, Professor Hills does not base his argument on an examination of the Court's cases, 
but rather upon a discussion of why it does not make sense for the Court to invalidate state legislation 
based on state legislative consensus--and on that score, he may well be right. For my own take on the 
federalism implications of state counting, see infra notes 294-296 and accompanying text. 
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their continued vitality.221 Thus, constitutional protection based on state leg-
islative consensus might still raise the specter of dead-hand rule. But here 
again, the same could be said of the "evolving standards" doctrine too.222 
Fourth and finally, just as I have tried not to make the point bigger than 
it is, I also do not want to make it smaller. In this Article, I have focused on 
the most prominent examples of state polling outside the Eighth Amendment-
but there are many others. The Supreme Court has followed the consensus 
view of the states when deciding cases under the Dormant Commerce Clause,221 
Takings Clause,224 and Double Jeopardy Clause.225 It has counted states in its 
personal jurisdiction analysis,226 and has taken an explicitly majoritarian approach 
. f . d' . 1 d' . 227 • 228 d d . . 229 to questions o JU tcta tscretion, statutory construction, an stare ectsts. 
221. See Michael J. Klarman, Majaritarian]udicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 491, 505 n.66 (1997) ("Because of inertia, enactment of legislation requires more than majority 
support; the same is true for repeal. Thus the failure to repeal existing legislation might indicate that 
a majority still supports it or that a minority sufficiently large to block repeal supports it. There is no 
way of telling for sure."). 
222. Indeed, the argument has even more force in the "evolving standards" context given the 
difficulty of repealing criminal law provisions. See Richard E. Myers, II, Responding to the Time-Based 
Failures of the Criminal Law Through a Criminal Sunset Provision, 49 B.C. L. REV. 132 7, 1329 (2008) 
("Once on the books, criminal law is difficult to repeal. It stays with us, despite changing moral 
convictions and majority preferences."); see also William J. Stuntz, The Pathalogical Politics of Criminal 
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 557 (2001) ("When the issue is subtracting crimes rather than adding 
them, legislative inertia is probably stronger in criminal law than elsewhere, since even groups with 
good reason to seek decriminalization hesitate to do so."). 
223. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981) (polling 
states to find a burden on interstate commerce imposed by outlier state's more restrictive regulation, 
noting, "Iowa's law is now out of step with the laws of all other Midwestern and Western States. Iowa 
thus substantially burdens the interstate flow of goods by truck."); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. 
Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 445-46 (1978) (polling states to find the same). 
224. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 221-23 (2003) (polling states to 
uphold state's use of interest on lawyers' trust accounts to pay for legal services for the needy); Penn. 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 109 (1978) (polling states to uphold landmark 
preservation law against takings claim). 
225. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 538 (1975) (polling states to find double jeopardy 
violation where juvenile was subject to both adjudicatory hearing and subsequent trial as adult). 
226. See, e.g, Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 615 (1990) (polling states to uphold 
tag jurisdiction, noting, "We do not know of a single state or federal statute, or a single judicial 
decision resting upon state law, that has abandoned in-state service as a basis for jurisdiction"); id. at 
627 ("Nothing we say today prevents individual States from limiting or entirely abandoning the in-
state-service basis of jurisdiction. And nothing prevents an overwhelming majority of them from 
doing so, with the consequence that the 'traditional notions of fairness' that this Court applies may 
change."). But see infra note 245 (noting that the Supreme Court does not appear to have counted 
states in other personal jurisdiction cases). 
227. See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 562 (1952) ("Discretion is only to be respected 
when it is conscious of the traditions which surround it and of the limits which an informed conscience 
sets to its exercise."). 
228. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 n.20 (1983) (''Yet contemporary 
standards must be considered in determining whether [tax exemption applies]."). 
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In the contempt context, the Court has even relied on "contemporary standards" 
to adjudicate the word "chicken shit."230 
In sum, explicitly majoritarian text may be unique to the Eighth Amend-
ment, but explicitly majoritarian decisionmaking is not. Rulings based on 
state legislative consensus penneate constitutional law. Why might this be so? 
B. Explanations 
In this section, I first address the question just posed: What might explain 
why consensus-based decisionmaking appears in so many doctrinal areas? I then 
tum to two additional questions that immediately come to mind: Why is state 
polling more formally entrenched in some areas than in others? And why might 
Supreme Court Justices of varying political and interpretive persuasions find state 
polling attractive? Here are a few thoughts to get the conversation started. 
1. The Phenomenon Itself 
As a practical matter, the phenomenon of explicitly majoritarian protection 
outside the Eighth Amendment is not all that hard to understand. Consti-
tutional decisionmaking comes down to judgment calls, and those judgment 
calls have to come from somewhere. Sure, the Justices could use their own 
judgment, but state legislative consensus provides an objective measure-
something more than personal predilection--of how such decisions should be 
made.231 Thus, we should not be surprised to see the Supreme Court tum to 
the states to decide what is fundamental, what is reasonable, which interests 
are sufficiently important, and so on. In the end, the Court's state polling 
exercises are not so different from what the rest of us do when making difficult 
decisions: we look to others for guidance. 
As a political matter, too, the Supreme Court's state polling exercises 
are readily understandable. Majoritarian decisions do not expose the Supreme 
Court to the same vulnerabilities that nonmajoritarian decisions do-a palpable 
229. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986) ("[E)very successful proponent of 
overruling precedent has borne the heavy burden of persuading the Court that changes in society or 
in the law dictate that the values served by srare decisis yield in favor of a greater objective."); Runyon 
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("If judges have woefully misinterpreted 
the mores of their day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in 
helpless submission, the hands of their successors."). 
230. See Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 700 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (invalidating a 
summary contempt finding for saying "chicken shit" in the courtroom). 
231. This is not to deny that the Justices' policy preferences might lead to manipulation of state 
polling data, but that is true in and outside the "evolving standards" context. See supra notes 217-220 
and accompanying text (discussing doctrinal manipulation of state polling data). 
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advantage for Justices who have neither the sword nor the purse to enforce their 
commands.232 So viewed, explicitly majoritarian constitutional protection-
particularly in the wake of the New Deal231-may well be as much about judicial 
prudence as it is about judicial deference. Simply put, it is the Supreme Court 
living up to its legacy as "the least dangerous" branch.214 
For these reasons (and perhaps others), one can easily see why the Supreme 
Court would poll the states when interpreting a variety of constitutional provi-
sions. The harder question is how to explain the differences in the Court's 
explicitly majoritarian approach across doctrinal lines. 
2. Doctrinal Differences 
In some ways, the doctrinal differences in the frequency and formality of 
explicitly majoritarian decisionmaking are just as one might expect. The 
Supreme Court's use of majoritarian benchmarks is the least doctrinally 
entrenched in the equal protection and First Amendment contexts--both areas 
where the Court is famous for taking on the states in the name of minority 
rights.235 On the other end of the spectrum, the Court's doctrine is probably 
most like "evolving standards" in the substantive due process context, where 
the Court engages in the politically hazardous task of identifying fundamental 
rights. 236 If discretion truly is the better part of valor, it makes sense that the 
Court would tread cautiously in recognizing rights not enumerated in consti-
232. Justice O'Connor has made the point explicitly. See, e.g., Sandra Day O'Connor, 
Remarks, Public Trust as a Dimension of Equal justice: Some Suggestions to Increase Public Trust, 36 Cr. 
REv. 10, 13 (1999) ("We don't have standing armies to enforce opinions, we rely on the confidence 
of the public in the correctness of those decisions. That's why we have to be aware of public 
opinions and of attitudes toward our system of justice, and it is why we must try to keep and build 
that trust."). 
233. Not one of the cases I have found was decided before the 1930s, a point that is not likely 
coincidental. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 4 (2009) (noting that in the wake of 
the New Deal, "a tacit deal was reached: the American people would grant the justices their power, 
so long as the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution did not stray too far from what a 
majority of the people believed it should be. For the most part, this deal has stuck."); see also id. at 
195-236 (discussing in depth the Supreme Court's capitulation to the New Deal program following 
President Roosevelt's court-packing plan). 
234. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawsoned., Scribner 1876). 
235. See generally supra Part II (analyzing equal protection and First Amendment doctrines); 
supra text accompanying note 128 (citing cases famous for countermajoritarian protection in the 
equal protection and First Amendment contexts). 
236. See generally supra Part LA (comparing the Supreme Court's substantive due process 
fundamental rights and "evolving standards" doctrines). 
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tutional text under the (also unenumerated) doctrine of C.Y.A.237 The Supreme 
Court has said as much itself. 238 
In other ways, the doctrinal differences are less obviously explicable. For 
example, the majoritarian approach of the Supreme Court's notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard cases is roughly comparable to what we see in the equal 
protection and First Amendment contexts239 -but few would describe the area 
of notice and opportunity to be heard as a bastion of countermajoritarian 
rights. Similarly, the politically hazardous nature of the protection at issue fails 
to explain why the Court does not count states in the controversial Fifth 
Amendment interrogation context240-nor does it explain the Court's right to 
jury cases, where state polling is formally entrenched even without all the drama 
associated with unenumerated constitutional rights. 241 In short, the Court's 
willingness to issue bold rulings in the first place provides some understanding 
as to why its commitment to majoritarian norms is stronger in some areas than 
in others, but it does not take us all of the way. 
A second piece of the puzzle may be the opportunity for majoritarian 
norms to seep into the Supreme Court's decisionmaking; some doctrinal areas 
are more susceptible to state polling than others. This would appear to explain 
the Court's Fifth Amendment interrogation cases and its approach in the area 
of notice and opportunity to be heard. In the Fifth Amendment context, the 
23 7. This venerable doctrine has other, perhaps more well known, iterations, but here the 
reference is to "Cover Your Authority." Cf. Winter, supra note 9, at 684 (suggesting that the Court's 
reliance on state polling in the Fourth Amendment context may have been "nothing more than 
acting prudently to cover its political flank"); Conkle, supra note 18, at 64 (''Nothing in constitutional 
law is more controversial than substantive due process."). 
238. See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) ("As a general 
matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because 
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended."); 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) ("Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view 
of our authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court 
is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional 
law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution."); Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) ("Substantive due process has at times been a 
treacherous field for this Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection 
to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of 
Rights .... That history counsels caution and restraint."). 
239. See generally supra Part 1.8.2 (discussing majoritarian decisionmaking under the Supreme 
Court's notice and opportunity to be heard cases); supra Part 11 (discussing the same under equal protection 
and First Amendment). 
240. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring warnings prior to custodial 
interrogation under the Fifth Amendment); see also LUCAS A. POWE, ]R., THE WARREN COURT 
AND AMERICAN POLITICS394 (2000) ("lfMiranda is not the most controversial decision by the Warren 
Court, it is close enough, and it is the most controversial criminal procedure decision hands down."). 
241. See supra text accompanying notes 192-203 (discussing majoritarian decisionmaking in 
the Sixth Amendment right to jury context). 
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Court is regulating police interrogation practices that are highly fact specific 
and rarely capable of state-by-state legislative comparisons.242 In its notice and 
opportunity to be heard cases, the Court is employing the same interest-
balancing approach it uses in its equal protection and First Amendment cases, 
so it is only natural to see majoritarian benchmarks seep into the Court's 
decisionmaking in the same way.243 
Yet here, too, there are limitations to the explanatory power of these 
doctrinal differences. In a few areas-very few-the Court does not count 
states even though its articulation of the constitutional standard clearly invites 
it. The Fourth Amendment's protection of only those privacy interests "that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable" provides perhaps the strongest 
example.244 The Court's personal jurisdiction analysis, which measures due 
process by way of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," to 
some extent provides another.245 In short, the opportunity for state polling in 
particular doctrinal frameworks helps further explain why we see explicitly ma-
joritarian decisionmaking more in some areas than others, but again, it does 
not take us all of the way. 
Of course, it could be that in broad swathes, the doctrinal differences in 
the Supreme Court's explicitly majoritarian approach make sense, but beyond 
that-in the few residual areas that remain-there really is no explanation. 
Why hasn't the Court counted states where the constitutional norm appears 
to invite it? Maybe the Justices haven't gotten around to it yet. Or maybe 
explicitly majoritarian decisionmaking is, at its most basic level, some sort of 
doctrinal entropy-a discemable force in the interpretive universe with no 
discemable pattern. For the rest of the story, perhaps we should be looking 
less at doctrine and more at the Justices applying it. 
242. This is not to say that the Fifth Amendment interrogation context is never susceptible to 
the sort of explicitly majoritarian decisionmaking that the Supreme Court does in other doctrinal 
areas. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) ("We do not think there is such 
justification for overruling Miranda. Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the 
point where the warnings have become part of our national culture."). 
243. See supra Part !.8.2 (discussing state polling in the notice and opportunity to be heard 
context); Part II (discussing state polling in equal protection and First Amendment contexts). 
244. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
245. While the Supreme Court in Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 
(1990), counted states and explicitly recognized the relevance of state legislative consensus in its 
personal jurisdiction analysis, id. at 615, 627, the Court does not appear to have taken an explicitly 
rnajoritarian approach to personal jurisdiction outside that case. See supra note 226 (quoting Burnham's 
rnajoritarian language). 
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3. Judicial Differences 
One of the most surprising discoveries about state polling as a larger 
doctrinal phenomenon is the variety of Justices who engage in it. Conserva-
tives, moderates, liberals--all have embraced the majority position of the states 
to define the contours of constitutional protection. Why? 
The attraction for judicial conservatives is fairly obvious. While not 
originalism, majoritarian doctrine is judicial minimalism in full flower. So long 
as the Supreme Court is counting states to determine the contours of consti-
tutional protection, there is no chance of bold rulings that leave the states 
behind. Indeed, the formal entrenchment of state polling in the substantive 
due process area is perhaps best explained as a doctrinal backlash to one 
fundamental rights case in which the Court clearly did not count states: Roe v. 
Wade.246 Liberal landmarks like Roe, Funnan v. Georgia,247 and Engel v. Vitale248 
would never have come to pass had the Court been polling states, and judicial 
conservatives would have preferred it had been that way. 
This is not to say that state polling always suits the Supreme Court's 
conservative Justices. Although Justice Scalia has opined that a policy's "wide 
. 1 1 1 " . " d 1 . "249 th . acceptance m ega cu ture IS a equate reason not to overru e 1t, e mverse 
is not necessarily true. Even where a legislative consensus has formed against 
a particular practice, judicial conservatives at times oppose constitutional 
protection. Consider, for example, Justice Burger's dissent in Baldwin v. New 
York,250 where the Court polled the states in ruling that a potential one-year 
sentence was sufficiently severe to trigger the right to jury.251 Lamenting the 
ruling, Chief Justice Burger tersely wrote, "That the 'near-uniform judgment of 
246. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (overturning the laws offorty-six states that placed limits on access to 
abortion in the first trimester). Others have recognized the point. See ROSEN, supra note 8, at 202 
("In response to Roe v. Wade, conservatives embraced a series of formalist approaches to the Constitution 
in an effort to constrain judicial discretion .... "); Post, supra note 11, at 88-91 (discussing the Supreme 
Court's conservative approach in Bowers as a result of its liberal result in Roe); see also Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (defending "restrained methodology" in the substantive due 
process area "lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy 
preferences of the members of this Court"). 
247. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (overturning the death penalty statutes of thirty-nine states). 
248. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (overturning the laws of thirty-nine states requiring or allowing 
school prayer). 
249. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314,331-32 (1999) (Scalia,]., dissenting). Chief]ustice 
Rehnquist apparently agreed. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (opinion by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist citing Justice Scalia's dissent in MitcheU for the proposition that "the fact 
that a rule has found 'wide acceptance in the legal culture' is 'adequate reason not to overrule' it"). 
250. 399 u.s. 66 (1970). 
251. See id. The Supreme Court's analysis in Baldwin is discussed at supra notes 201-202 and 
accompanying text. 
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the Nation' is otherwise than the judgment in some of its parts affords no basis 
for me to read into the Constitution something not found there."212 Indeed, 
in the relatively few instances in which the Court has gone against the result 
of a straight state count, the ruling typically has been conservative, resulting 
in constitutional protection that lags behind the states as opposed to leapfrog-
. h 253 gmg t em. 
The attractiveness of state polling to the Supreme Court's moderates is 
also not hard to understand. These Justices are quite willing to recognize 
shifts in constitutional values, but they tend to be cautious in their approach 
and most comfortable with change backed by larger societal forces. Justice 
O'Connor's view of the Court's role evidences the point nicely: 
[R]eal change, when it comes, stems principally from attitudinal shifts 
in the population at large. Rare indeed is the legal victory-in court 
or legislature-that is not a careful by-product of an emerging social 
consensus. Courts, in particular, are mainly reactive institutions.254 
Justice Kennedy, too, has described the Court's decisionmaking in explicitly 
majoritarian terms.255 Even empirical evidence has shown the Court's moderate, 
swing voters to be more responsive to majoritarian influences than Justices on 
either end of the ideological spectrum.256 Little wonder, then, that Justices 
Kennedy and O'Connor have signed onto (and often penned) a number of the 
most prominent state polling cases, both in and outside the "evolving standards" 
context.257 Explicitly majoritarian decisionmaking fits them like a glove. 
252. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 77 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
253. This explains why the dissenters in most of these cases are the Court's liberals. See supra 
note 218 (listing a number of cases in which the Coun has rejected the result that state polling would 
suggest and quoting state counting arguments by dissenting Justices). 
254. See SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECfiONS OF A SUPREME 
COURT jUSTICE 166 (Craig Joyce ed., 2003). 
255. See Jason DeParle, In Battle w Pick Next Justice, Right Says Avoid a Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 27, 2005, at A1 (quoting Justice Kennedy as stating, "In the long term, the court is not 
antimajoritarian-it's majoritarian."). This proclivity for majoritarian rulings may also explain Justice 
Kennedy's willingness to consider foreign law in constitutional decisionmaking. See Jeffrey Toobin, 
Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion far Fareign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW 
YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42 (discussing Justice Kennedy's interest in foreign law and quoting him 
as explaining, "There is also the constitution with a small 'c,' the sum total of customs and mores of 
the community" and "[t]he closer the big 'C' and the small 'c,' the better off you are as a society"). 
256. See William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attirudinal Model, and Supreme 
Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analyric Perspective, 58 J. PoL 169 (1996) (providing an empirical study 
comparing responsiveness of moderate, conservative, and liberal Justices to public opinion). 
257. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (opinion by Justice Kennedy); Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (opinion by Justice Kennedy); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 
538 U.S. 408 {2003) (opinion by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor); Troxel v. Granville, 
520 U.S. 57 (2000) (opinion by Justice O'Connor); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (opinion 
by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor); Reno v. Aores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) {opinion by 
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That leaves the Supreme Court's liberals. What might they find attrac-
tive about explicitly majoritarian doctrine? Sometimes the answer is nothing. 
The Court's liberal members do not need the states to recognize constitutional 
protection; they are more than willing to make the move on their own.258 
Indeed, the minimalism inherent in majoritarian doctrine has at times struck 
the Court's liberals as downright offensive. In his fervent dissent in Michael 
H. v. Gerald 0.,259 Justice Brennan (joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun) 
decried the Court's use of state counting to deny a putative father's substantive 
due process right to prove paternity of a child born into another couple's mar-
riage, claiming: 
[T]he plurality acts as if the only purpose of the Due Process Clause is 
to confirm the importance of interests already protected by a majority 
of the States. Transforming the protection afforded by the Due Process 
Clause into a redundancy mocks those who, with care and purpose, 
wrote the Fourteenth Amendment.260 
Just as state polling sometimes gives the Court's conservatives more constitu-
tional protection than they would like, it sometimes gives the Court's liberals 
less. 
Yet for liberal Justices, too, explicitly majoritarian doctrine has its advan-
tages. First and foremost, it is not originalism. Explicitly majoritarian doctrine 
results in constitutional protection that will more or less reflect contemporary 
norms, rather than those that prevailed 200 years ago.261 In so doing, it endorses 
the notion of a living Constitution-Dne able to respond to what Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes famously called "the felt necessities of the time"262--even if the 
pace is sometimes slower than liberals like. Simply put, it works. Judicial mini-
malism may reign in the short run, but in the long run, liberalism wins. And 
until then, state legislative consensus provides strong support for constitutional 
Justice Kennedy); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (opinion by Justice Kennedy); Schad v. Arizona, 
501 U.S. 624 (1991) (opinion joined by justices O'Connor and Kennedy); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186 (1986) (opinion joined by Justice O'Connor). 
258. See supra notes 246-248 and accompanying text (discussing liberal landmarks where the 
Coun upset the majority practice of the states). 
259. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Michael H. v. Gerald D. is discussed at supra note 43 and accompa-
nying text. 
260. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
261. Again, I concede that to the extent existing state statutes do not accurately reflect contem-
porary public opinion, this will not be the case. See supra notes 221-222 and accompanying text 
(discussing point). But the issue seems to me a more generic problem of the ostensibly rnajoritarian 
legislative and executive branches--that current majorities may bind those in the future not by 
agreement, but sheer inerria. 
262. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1, 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963). 
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protection with little downside to recogmzmg it. The result is like low-
hanging fruit-easy pickings for constitutional protection. 
Perhaps, then, the real reason we see explicitly majoritarian protection 
across a variety of constitutional contexts is that it offers a little something to 
everyone. It is neither originalism nor liberalism, yet is attractive to propo-
nents of both. One thing is certain: it is not the case, as conventional wisdom 
would have it, that the leading interpretive methodologies on the right and 
left are fundamentally at odds with the sort of explicitly majoritarian deci-
sionmaking examined in this Article.163 Originalism might seem incompatible 
with decisions based on state legislative consensus, but the originalists on the 
Court make room for it. Liberalism may not need state counting to back it up, 
but the progressives work it in. Far from "ignoring, as much as possible"164 the 
positions of state legislatures, Justices across the ideological spectrum routinely, 
and expressly, incorporate those positions into the content of constitutional 
law. The implications are striking. 
C. Implications 
In this section, I discuss the significance of state polling as a larger doc-
trinal phenomenon, turning first to death penalty theory and then to broader 
263. See ROSEN, supra note 8, at 202 ("On the Supreme Court and in the legal academy today, 
the leading schools of constitutional interpretation on the left and the right tend to embrace a heroic 
version of judicial power, which insists that judges can demonstrate their devotion to principle by 
acting unilaterally-that is, ignoring, as much as possible, the constitutional views of the president, 
Congress, the state legislatures, and the American people."); Brennan's Approach to Reading and 
Interpreting the Constitution, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 41 (1999) (panel including, among others, 
Michael McConnell, who stated, "The central problem with Uustice Brennan's] jurisprudence is that 
he cast aside all of the traditional constraints on constitutional decision making. This approach 
placed into the hands of judges the power to tum their own views of good social policy into law 
without any credible basis in constitutional text, history, precedent, constitutional tradition, or 
contemporary democratic warrant."); Mark T ushnet, Religion and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 
33 LOY. L. REV. 221, 229 (1987) (noting "the general problem of originalism, which is that social 
change makes it a theory of constitutional interpretation that regularly fails to provide guidance on 
matters of contemporary constitutional controversy because it disregards the complexities of both the 
historical record and the current situation"); see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 
U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 863 (1989) ("Nonoriginalism, which under one or another formulation invokes 
'fundamental values' as the touchstone of constitutionality, plays precisely to this weakness [of 
judging by personal policy preferences]. It is very difficult for a person to discern a difference between 
those political values that he personally thinks most important, and those political values that are 
'fundamental to our society.' Thus, by the adoption of such a criterion judicial personalization of the 
law is enormously facilitated. (One might reduce this danger by insisting that the new 'fundamental 
values' invoked to replace original meaning be clearly and objectively manifested in the laws of the 
society. But among all the varying tests suggested by nonoriginalist theoreticians, I am unaware that 
that one ever appears.)"). 
264. ROSEN, supra note 8, at 202; see also supra note 263 (quoting sentence in its entirety). 
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themes in constitutional law. I set aside a discussion of the methodological impli-
cations of state counting, as those issues have been ably analyzed elsewhere.265 
I also set aside what explicitly majoritarian doctrine might mean for the so-
called "popular constitutionalists," as that discussion is sufficiently extensive 
d d. . 266 an tscrete to warrant separate treatment on tts own. 
1. Death Penalty Theory 
To understand the significance of my findings for death penalty theory, 
it is instructive to return to the "evolving standards" debate that framed the 
inquiry in the first place. For years now, scholars have criticized the "evolving 
standards" doctrine, and for good reason: the place that needs counterma-
joritarian protection the most is the least equipped to receive it.267 Defenders 
counter that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual 
punishments" provides a unique license for the Supreme Court to follow 
majority preferences.268 So framed, the debate ends a stalemate. Explicitly 
majoritarian protection may not make sense, but it is the natural product of 
explicitly majoritarian constitutional text. 
Thus far, the assumption on both sides of the debate is that the sort of 
explicitly majoritarian decisionmaking that the Supreme Court does under 
the "evolving standards" doctrine is unique to the Eighth Amendment.269 It 
is not. Given the stunning variety of contexts outside the Eighth Amendment 
in which the Court counts states, it is difficult to conclude that majoritarian 
text has much to do with much of anything. Even without the benefit of 
Eighth Amendment text, the Court routinely-and explicitly-bases constitu-
tional protection on whether a majority of states agree with it. 
Because current scholarship has assumed that the "evolving standards" 
doctrine is textually driven, it also has failed to appreciate the choices implicit 
in the Supreme Court's use of the doctrine in the first place. Interpreting the 
term "unusual" to justify constitutional protection that follows majoritarian 
sentiment may be one way to effectuate Eighth Amendment protection, but 
it is not the only way. To the extent the terms "cruel" and "unusual" have 
265. See, e.g., T onja Jacobi, The Subtle UnraveUng of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation 
as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C.L.R. 1089 (2006). 
266. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Popular Constitutionalism and Our (Already) Lemocratic Supreme 
Coutt (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
267. See supra notes 1,4 and accompanying text. 
268. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
269. See supra notes 7--8 and accompanying text. 
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separate meanings at all,270 the word "unusual" under the Eighth Amendment 
can support a number of plausible interpretations. A punishment can be 
unusual because it is unusually cruel, either in the abstract (torture) or in 
relation to the offense or offender's culpability;271 unusual because it is inflicted 
in an arbitrary and capricious manner;272 unusual because it is procedurally 
· l 273 1 b . . 1 274 I h 1rregu ar; or even unusua ecause 1t 1s contrary to ong usage. n s ort, 
nothing about the text of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause requires, or 
even necessarily invites, protection that follows majoritarian sentiment. In the 
Eighth Amendment context as elsewhere, majoritarian doctrine is not a given. 
Majoritarian doctrine is a choice. 
This recognition, in tum, allows for yet another: the "evolving standards" 
doctrine might be problematic, but it is not the crux of the problem. What 
majoritarian doctrine seemingly obscures, but in fact reveals, is a Supreme 
Court naturally inclined towards majoritarian decisionmaking anyway, rendering 
the debate over "evolving standards" largely moot. In the end, the Court's 
majoritarian approach to Eighth Amendment protection is more a function of 
270. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958) ("Whether the word 'unusual' has any 
qualitative meaning different from 'cruel' is not clear. On the few occasions this Court has had to 
consider the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not 
seem to have been drawn. These cases indicate that the Court simply examines the particular 
punishment involved in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment, without regard to 
any subtleties of meaning that might be latent in the word 'unusual."'). 
271. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) ("What constitutes a cruel and 
unusual punishment has not been exactly decided. It has been said that ordinarily the terms imply 
something inhuman and barbarous,-torture and the like."); id. at 367 ("[l]t is a precept of justice 
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense."); see also HUGO ADAM 
BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 37 (1977) ("'Cruel and 
unusual punishment,' one is entitled to conclude, really means 'unusually severe punishment."'). 
272. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (reading the 
"cruel and unusual punishments" clause to prohibit the imposition of death in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner). 
273. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) ("'[llhe penalty of death is qualitatively 
different' from any other sentence. We are satisfied that this qualitative difference between death and 
other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed." (quoting 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976))); Hoffman, supra note 7, at 151 ("The cruel 
and unusual punishments clause has, in effect, become a 'super due process clause' for death-penalty 
cases only, imposing greatly heightened procedural standards to ensure the fairness and accuracy of both 
the guilt and sentencing stages of capital trials."); see also Louis D. Bilionis, The Unusualness of Capital 
Punishment, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 601, 614 (2000) ("[A] punishment is unusual if it is unreliable in 
practice. This sense is intimated when the critique complains of the risk of erroneous convictions of the 
innocent, as well as the risk of legally erroneous convictions." (emphasis omitted)). 
2 7 4. This interpretation, unlike the others, has not been recognized by the Supreme Court. See 
John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of "Unusual": The Eighth Amendment as a Bar w Cruel 
Innovation, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1739, 1745-46 (2008) (arguing that the framers understood the word 
"unusual" to mean "contrary to long usage," an interpretation that in practice would "precisely invert the 
evolving standards of decency test" by striking cruel innovations in punishment despite their popularity). 
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its inherently majoritarian proclivities than any fidelity to constitutional text, a 
point that becomes all the more apparent when one considers the implications of 
explicitly majoritarian decisionmaking in the larger constitutional universe. 
2. Constitutional Theory 
The most pressing question of constitutional theory over the last half 
century has been how to reconcile the countermajoritarian difficulty-the 
notion that unelected, more or less politically unaccountable judges are able 
to thwart majority will in a land of majority rule.275 Alexander Bickel coined 
the term almost fifty years ago,276 and scholars have not been able to stop talk-
ing about it since. Barry Friedman has labeled this discourse "an Academic 
Obsession,"277 and for good reason. Commentary on the countermajoritarian 
difficulty is now so voluminous that there is commentary on the voluminous 
commentary (which I suppose I have just joined).278 
For the most part, scholars who have found a way out of this difficulty 
have done so by showing that the Supreme Court is less countermajoritarian 
than commonly supposed.279 As a result, the notion that the Court renders 
reliably majoritarian decisions is hardly new. It has been cutting-edge long 
enough to be considered "underground conventional wisdom" among a small 
but growing group of legal scholars,280 and is something social scientists have 
known (and shown) for decades.281 
275. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1962) ("OJudicial 
review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system .... [W]hen the Supreme Coun declares unconsti-
tutional a legislative act ... it thwarts the will of the representatives of the actual people of the here 
and now."). 
276. Id. 
2 7 7. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajaritarian 
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALEL.J.l53 (2002). 
278. See, e.g., id. at 155-63 (discussing the scholarly preoccupation with countermajoritarian 
difficulty); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article 
V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 495 (1994) (same); Chemerinsky, supra note I, at 70-72 (same); Neal 
Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advice-givers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1709-10 (1998) (same); Steven L. 
Winter, Indetenninacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441 ( 1990) (same). 
2 79. For a sampling of the literature, see supra note II. A notable exception is John Han Ely, who 
famously tackled the countermajoritarian difficulty by justifying judicial review in democracy-enhancing 
terms. See generally ELY, supra note 1 (defending judicial review as a means of protecting rights that 
preserve the democratic process). 
280. ROSEN, supra note 8, at xii. 
281. See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PuBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME C0UR T ix (1989) 
(arguing that the Supreme Coun "has been roughly as rnajoritarian as other American policy 
makers" and empirically supponing claim); ROBERT G. McCLoSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME 
COURT 23 (1960) (arguing that "the Supreme Coun has seldom, if ever, flatly and for very long 
resisted a really unmistakable wave of public sentiment" and empirically supponing claim); David G. 
Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision-Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 
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Within this body of work, scholars have spent no small amount of time 
explaining why the Supreme Court's decisions are roughly as majoritarian as 
those of the legislative and executive branches.282 While crediting the judicial 
appointments process as a primary conduit for majoritarian values,281 these 
commentators have sought to show how constitutional meaning can change 
even when the Justices do not. Political scientists have used regime politics 
literature to view the Court as an institutional arm of the governing political 
coalition.284 Constitutional historians have provided detailed accounts of the 
influence of larger sociopolitical context. 285 Court and culture scholars have 
demonstrated the awesome power of social movements in generating consti-
tutional change.286 While all of these are worthy endeavors, one cannot help 
but wonder whether the explanation for majoritarian decisions might just be 
simpler than that. Perhaps the main reason that the Court produces widely 
majoritarian outcomes is widely used majoritarian doctrine. 
Indeed, explicitly majoritarian doctrine may be not only the strongest 
explanation for majoritarian decisions, but the strongest evidence of them as 
well. One could set about proving the Supreme Court's proclivity for majori-
tarian protection in a number of different ways--extended historical analyses 
and empirical research with comparisons of the Court's rulings and public 
47 J. POL. 652, 662 (1985) (arguing that the Court's decisions in the new deal period have been 
"surprisingly consistent with majoritarian principles" and empirically supporting claim); Robert A. 
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 
279, 285 (1957) (arguing that "the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line 
with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States" and empirically 
supporting claim). 
282. See MARSHALL, supra note 281. 
283. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 9, at 613-14 ("As vacancies occur, presidents fill them 
with judges whose views are at least somewhat similar to their own and, more important, to the views 
of the people who elected them. Thus, as the views of the electorate change, the change is reflected 
in the changing composition of the judiciary."); Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 256, at 171 ("The 
conventional explanation of the relationship between public opinion and Supreme Court decisions is 
that the influence of public opinion is indirect-that it is mediated largely through the impact of 
public opinion on presidential elections and the subsequent effects of presidential appointments on 
the ideological composition of the Court."); Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 
85 B.U. L. REV. 821, 832 (2005) (discussing view of "the appointments process as the primary 
mechanism for linking the policy preferences of the justices and legislative majorities"). 
284. See generally Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or judicial Independence? The Regime Politics 
Uterature Hits the Law Schools, 32 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 511 (2007) (noting that "(f]or at least fifty 
years, prominent political scientists have traced the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to the 
policy and political commitments of governing partisan regimes" and discussing the legal academy's 
newfound tum to regime politics literature to explain the Court's alliance with majority will). 
285. On this score, Michael Klarman's work is as compelling as any I have seen. See, e.g., Michael J. 
Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1721 (2001 ); Michael 
J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Malem Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REv. 48 (2001); Michael J. 
Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Uberties Rewlutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
286. See, e.g., Balkin & Seigel, supra note 11; Post, supra note 11; Eskridge, supra note 36. 
The Unexceptionalism of "Evolving Standards" 417 
opinion are two that immediately come to mind.287 But both of these are like 
catching the Justices in the act, when in many cases all we have to do is ask 
them. We can sidestep the inferences and possibility of coincidences. In opinion 
after opinion, the Supreme Court has actually told us that majoritarian deci-
sionmaking is what it is trying to do. 
Those obsessed with the countermajoritarian difficulty may see these points 
as good news. If we cannot justify an unelected judiciary in a representative 
democracy, we can at least take solace in the fact that the Supreme Court's 
decisionmaking is a good deal more democratic than most everyone seems to 
think. Granted, unelected Justices (rather than "The People Themselves"288 ) 
are still making the decisions. But where the Court follows state legislative 
consensus, those decisions reflect the views of a majority of local legislative 
majorities--and that's about as democratic as judicial decisionmaking gets. So 
viewed, the countermajoritarian difficulty is perhaps not so difficult after all. 
The Court's decisionmaking is patently majoritarian, and in a democratically 
representative way. 
At the same time, the pervasiveness of explicitly majoritarian doctrine 
presents a serious challenge to the assumptions that justify the institution of 
judicial review in the first place. The whole point of having an unelected judici-
ary is its ability to serve as a check on majority rule, which is why the Supreme 
Court's countermajoritarian capacity undergirds most every normative theory 
of judicial review.289 Explicitly majoritarian doctrine renders this role a virtual 
impossibility, for a check on majority will that depends on majority will is 
hardly a check at all. Granted, the Court can still perform what others have 
called "sheep dog" judicial review, holding laggard states to a higher national 
standard.290 But by and large, even Congress can do that.291 Thus, while majori-
tarian doctrine might ease concerns that the Supreme Court is a "deviant in-
stitution"292 in our democratic society, it also largely eviscerates the justification 
287. See supra note 281 (listing empirical research supporting the rnajoritarian claim); supra 
note 285 (listing constitutional history scholarship supporting the rnajoritarian claim). 
288. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (arguing that the Constitution vests ultimate interpretive authority to "the 
people themselves" and that as a consequence, judicial supremacy is illegitimate). 
289. See Friedman, supra note 11, at 279 ("[M]ost extant normative theories of judicial review 
rest on the capaciry of judges to act in a manner contrary to political or popular preferences."). 
290. See Heffernan, supra note 5, at 1446 (describing Supreme Court's consensus-based approach 
under the Eighth Amendment as "a sheep-dog process of judicial review, one that rounds up stray states"). 
2 91. The 1964 Civil Rights Act provides a prime example of Congress performing this sheep-
dog function. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
292. BICKEL, supra note 275, at 18 ("OJudicial review is a deviant institution in the American 
democracy."). 
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for judicial review in the first place. To the extent a sufficiently large number 
of states act in a pernicious manner, the Court is unlikely to do anything about 
it, resulting in a new, not-so-countermajoritarian difficulty: constitutional protec-
tion that, like the fair-weather friend, is there in good times but gone when 
needed the most. 
Finally, the phenomenon of majoritarian doctrine has far-reaching impli-
cations for our federal system of government. One of the defining virtues of 
federalism is a state's ability to experiment with policies different from those 
of other jurisdictions.293 In some ways, state polling supports that virtue: where 
most (or even half) of the states are experimenting too, the Court is unlikely to 
impose what Justice Harlan famously termed "a constitutional straight jacket"294 
upon them. Yet in other ways, explicitly majoritarian doctrine places sharp 
limits on the freedom that federalism ostensibly provides. Where the states 
have formed a consensus on an issue, experience shows that outlier jurisdictions 
will have little room to resist it, even if local considerations legitimate a differ-
ent path.295 Granted, the type of federal interference with state autonomy is 
different from what we typically associate with federalism concerns; although 
the federal government is imposing a national norm, the source of that norm is 
actually the sister states.296 But that is little consolation to states wanting to go 
their own way.297 In the end, outlier jurisdictions remain vulnerable to regulation 
just by virtue of their status as outliers. 
CONCLUSION 
Within the academy, there is little recognition of explicitly majoritarian 
decisionmaking outside the Eighth Amendment; scholars tend to think of the 
"evolving standards" doctrine as an anomaly in constitutional law. Yet the 
Supreme Court's state polling in the death penalty context is nowhere near as 
293. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 117, 133 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing 
one of the "basic virtues" of federalism as "leav[ing] ample room for governmental and social experimen-
tation in a society as diverse as ours"). 
294. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,45 (1963) (Harlan,]., concurring). 
295. The Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment right to jury decisions illustrate the point nicely. 
See, e.g., Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 134-36 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's majoritarian 
approach to Sixth Amendment protection on the basis that it "ignores both the basic fairness of the 
New York procedure and the peculiar local considerations that have led the New York Legislature to 
conclude that trial by jury is more apt to retard than further justice for criminal defendants in New 
York City" and discussing especially congested trial dockets in New York City). 
296. I credit jim Gibson forthis point, with thanks. 
297. If Steven Calabresi and Nicholas Terrell are right in arguing that coalition building makes 
tyranny of the majority less likely at the federal level than at the state level, this is little consolation 
indeed. See Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number of States and the Economics of 
American Federalism (June 18, 2009), at 32-34, amilable at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1421903. 
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peculiar as it seems. Across a stunning variety of civil liberties contexts, the 
Court routinely-and explicitly--decides constitutional protection based on 
whether a majority of states agree with it. 
The implications are significant. For death penalty theorists, the phenome-
non of explicitly majoritarian decisionmaking outside the Eighth Amendment 
calls into question the leading defense of the "evolving standards" doctrine-
explicitly majoritarian Eighth Amendment text. For constitutional theorists, the 
phenomenon of explicitly majoritarian doctrine provides arguably the strongest 
evidence yet of the Supreme Court's inherently majoritarian institutional nature. 
The result is constitutional protection that shatters the conventional conception 
of judicial review as an undemocratic exercise, eviscerates the countermajori-
tarian function that justifies the Court's existence, and reveals the freedom of 
federalism to be more illusory than real. 
All of this suggests that we should be talking about, and teaching, the unex-
ceptionalism of "evolving standards." Constitutional law texts do not discuss 
state legislative consensus as a basis for identifying and applying constitutional 
norms, nor do the leading constitutional treatises.298 This is unfortunate in part 
because our students will one day be litigators looking to effectuate constitutional 
change, and in part because it reflects an impoverished view of constitutional law 
as it actually exists. Explicitly majoritarian doctrine tells us something about 
the Supreme Court's inclination to play the heroic, countermajoritarian role 
for which it is famous. We ought to listen. 
298. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CoNTEXT (2008); 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (3d ed. 2006); NOWAK 
& ROTUNDA, supra note 19; RONALD 0. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES 
ANDNOTES (9thed. 2009). 
